The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types

Rusch, Hannes

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2018.12.005

Cited by 16 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 33 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…That is, we could have a p i for each player i. Existing studies [33][34][35] focus on a discrete trait whereby any given player either can (p i = 1) or cannot (p i = 0) participate in collaboration.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Newton [34] considers the evolution of collaboration across a broad range of environments and gives conditions under which positive amounts of collaboration can be expected to evolve. Most recently, Rusch [35] gives a comprehensive study of collaboration in two player, two strategy games, showing that amongst such games, the prisoner's dilemma is the most hostile to the evolution of collaboration, but that collaboration can evolve even in niches (mixtures of games) in which the prisoner's dilemma makes up as much as forty percent of all interactions. Table 1.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Collaboration leads to cooperation on sparse networks

Angus

Newton

2020

PLoS Comput Biol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

For almost four decades, cooperation has been studied through the lens of the prisoner's dilemma game, with cooperation modelled as the play of a specific strategy. However, an alternative approach to cooperative behavior has recently been proposed. Known as collaboration, the new approach considers mutualistic strategic choice and can be applied to any game. Here, we bring these approaches together and study the effect of collaboration on cooperative dynamics in the standard prisoner's dilemma setting. It turns out that, from a baseline of zero cooperation in the absence of collaboration, even relatively rare opportunities to collaborate can support material, and robust, levels of cooperation. This effect is mediated by the interaction structure, such that collaboration leads to greater levels of cooperation when each individual strategically interacts with relatively few other individuals, matching well-known characteristics of human interaction networks. Conversely, collaboratively induced cooperation vanishes from dense networks, thus placing environmental limits on collaboration's successful role in cooperation.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaboration leads to cooperation on sparse networks

Angus

Newton

2020

PLoS Comput Biol

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Most of all, while in the model the focus is on the effect of harsher environments on the probability of cooperation, future research needs to investigate how this effect interacts with standard rationales for the evolution of cooperation, including crucially network reciprocity. Moreover, an avenue for future research is to explore the effect of harsher environments when players are able to collaborate, in being able to make coordinated moves towards strategies that are mutually beneficial 74,75 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Adversity and cooperation in heterogeneous pairs

Jaegher

2019

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides a game-theoretic model of the effect of higher adversity on the evolution of cooperation. The focus lies on how this effect of higher adversity is impacted when there is transient, non-genetic heterogeneity in the form of differences in the players’ capabilities of contributing to the public good, in the benefits they obtain from the public good, or in their cooperation costs. A framework is provided that identifies the common mechanisms that are at work across two models of cooperation (jointly producing a public good, and jointly defending an existing public good), and across the mentioned types of heterogeneity. With relatively small heterogeneity, higher adversity generates a common-enemy effect for large cooperation costs and a deterrence effect for small cooperation costs. Yet, these results on the effect of higher adversity are completely reversed for relatively large heterogeneity.

show abstract

“…The row and the column players represent the downstream Cournot competitors. For some restrictions imposed on the payoffs (we discuss them further in this section), the considered R&D investment game constitutes prominent examples of symmetric games, i.e., the prisoner's dilemma, the deadlock game, and the harmony game (Farahani and Sheikhmohammady, 2014;Płatkowski, 2017;Rusch, 2019). Let us now transform the above payoff matrix into the standard symmetric social game form (Curtis Eaton, 2004;Farahani and Sheikhmohammady, 2014;Płatkowski, 2017).…”

Section: Greed and Fear In Randd Investment Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Greed and Fear in Downstream R&D Games

Karbowski¹

2019

Decyzje

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to investigate the fi rms' incentives to engage in process R&D under vertical industrial setting, when the raising rivals' cost effect is present. We show that R&D investment of the downstream duopoly fi rm raises the rival's marginal costs of production. The downstream R&D behavior can give rise to the symmetric investment games, i.e., the prisoner's dilemma, the deadlock game and the harmony game, between downstream competitors. If the costs of the R&D investments made by the downstream fi rms are large enough, the downstream fi rms can participate in the harmony game, which results in the investment hold-up or the creation of the R&D-avoiding cartel. For more R&D-effi cient downstream fi rms, the downstream investment game can end up in the prisoner's dilemma or the deadlock game. In the prisoner's dilemma, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, but such a behavior is not Pareto optimal. In the prisoner's dilemma, greed and fear make fi rms invest in R&D. In the deadlock game, both downstream fi rms invest in R&D, and such a behavior is Pareto optimal. The R&D investments are not induced by any social tension (greed or fear).

show abstract

The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types

Cited by 16 publications

References 33 publications

Collaboration leads to cooperation on sparse networks

Collaboration leads to cooperation on sparse networks

Adversity and cooperation in heterogeneous pairs

Greed and Fear in Downstream R&D Games

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About