The Evolution of Covert Signaling

Abstract

Human sociality depends upon the benefits of mutual aid and extensive communication. However, diverse norms and preferences complicate mutual aid, and ambiguity in meaning hinders communication. Here we demonstrate that 3 these two problems can work together to enhance cooperation through the strategic use of deliberately ambiguous signals: covert signaling. Covert signaling is the transmission of information that is accurately received by its IntroductionMuch research on human cooperation has focused on the free-rider problem: how to maintain cooperation when individuals' interests are opposed to those of the 24 group. However, individual interests are often aligned with those of the group, and these mutualistic scenarios may be equally important (Skyrms, 2004; Calcott, 2008; Tomasello et al., 2012;Smaldino, 2014). But mutualism provides a different 27 dilemma. When individuals differ in preferences or norms it is harder to efficiently coordinate. Forming reliable expectations of partner behavior that make coordination possible is therefore essential for the evolution of mutualism (Schelling, 1960). 30Consider, for example, a couple planning their Saturday. Chris wants to go to the opera; Pat wants to go to the monster truck rally. Each would rather do something together than alone, but each has a different preference (Luce & Raiffa, 33 1957). If such mismatches are sufficiently frequent, Chris and Pat might be better off finding new partners with better-aligned interests. Successful cooperation requires resolution of this clash of preferences. Human societies are replete with 36 dilemmas of this kind (Boyd & Richerson, 1994), and the need to efficiently coordinate extends to many forms of collective action (Ostrom, 2000 ences (Castro & Toro, 2007;Efferson et al., 2008; Mace & Holden, 2005; McElreath et al., 2003; Moffett, 2013; Nettle & Dunbar, 1997). Language can also serve as a marker for social coordination (Nettle & Dunbar, 1997), as can visible purchasing 51 and fashion choices (Berger & Heath, 2008;Smaldino et al., 2017). Communication is implicated in all these solutions. However, much communication is ambiguous. Is this ambiguity merely the result of constraints on the accuracy 54 of communication? It may naïvely appear that communication should have clarity as its goal. However, purposeful ambiguity may allow signalers flexibility and plausible deniability (Eisenberg, 1984;Pinker et al., 2008;Santana, 2014). Previ-57 ous work has illustrated how leaders may use ambiguous language to rally diverse followers (Eisenberg, 1984), politicians may use vague platforms to avoid committing to specific policies (Aragonès & Neeman, 2000), and suitors may mask their 60 flirtations to be viewed innocuously if their affections are unreciprocated (Gersick & Kurzban, 2014 (Kaufman, 1967; Wolosin, 1975;Fischer, 2009;Hruschka, 2010; Toma et al., 72 2012). To be clear, we focus on those aspects of individual variation for which similarity enhances cooperation-these include norms, values, and identity (Smaldi...

Paths to Polarization: How Extreme Views, Miscommunication, and Random Chance Drive Opinion Dynamics

“…Our operationalization of communication noise could be interpreted as a modulation of private opinion, but communication noise could also be interpreted as misunderstanding of perfectly-reproduced, publicly voiced opinions. People often communicate public opinions that differ from their private opinions when incentives for the parties involved are not aligned (Crawford & Sobel, 1982;Pinker, Nowak, & Lee, 2008;Smaldino, Flamson, & McElreath, 2018). Second, we ignored the structural influence of explicit identity groups.…”

Social Identity and Cooperation in Cultural Evolution

“…My colleagues and I recently developed a mathematical model to investigate the conditions under which covert signaling strategies should evolve in a world where more overt signaling strategies dominate (Smaldino et al 2017). We showed first that a necessary condition for the evolution of covert signaling is a neutral or open-minded attitude toward strangers.…”

“…Assuming two or more individuals have the psychological machinery for shared attention and joint behaviors (Tomasello et al, 2005;Gallotti & Frith 2013;Heyes 2013), it is beneficial for them to maximize the degree to which they can harmoniously coordinate their efforts to generate the most productive synergistic outcome. If they share goals, vocabulary, and behavioral norms, coordination may go deeper and more smoothly, generating a larger benefit compared with individuals who cooperate out of obligation or necessity but must struggle to find common ground (McElreath et al 2003;Calcott 2008;Smaldino et al 2017). Thus, individuals must find a way to assort not only according to their cooperative tendencies, but according to their norms and values.…”

“…The expression of a social identity might take the form of an overt declaration ("I love socialism! "), covert signals such as encrypted jokes referencing shared experiences (Flamson & Barrett 2008;Flamson & Bryant 2013;Smaldino et al 2017), or markers such as clothing or vocabulary. Because of the high dimensionality of social identity, however, an individual cannot and should not express every facet of his or her identity.…”

“…Covert signaling may be formally defined as the transmission of information that is accurately received by its intended audience but obscured when perceived by others (Smaldino et al 2017). Instances of covert signaling may be quite common.…”