The evolution of division of labour in structured and unstructured groups

Cooper, Guy Alexander; Frost, Hadleigh; Liu, Ming; West, Stuart A.

doi:10.7554/elife.71968

Cited by 23 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Evolutionary division of labour models typically predict that division of labour evolves when efficiency benefits increase with higher levels of individual specialisation ("accelerating returns") but not in the absence of efficiency benefits ("linear" or "diminishing returns"; Fig. 3b) [126][127][128][129] . However, such an efficiency increase due to specialisation is not always observed in eusocial organisms 130,131 .…”

Section: Behavioural and Morphological Specialisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, such an efficiency increase due to specialisation is not always observed in eusocial organisms 130,131 . Furthermore, some recent work has highlighted that division of labour can also evolve under diminishing returns if individuals differ in their efficiency for task performance or if beneficial synergies emerge from division of labour 129,132 .…”

Section: Behavioural and Morphological Specialisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The evolution of eusociality: Kin selection theory, division of labour models, and evo-devo explanations

Kreider¹,

Pen²

2022

Preprint

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The evolution of eusociality has long been recognized as an evolutionary paradox. We identify three different but complementary approaches to the study of the evolution of eusociality. Kin selection models explain why individuals can evolve to have distinct reproductive or non-reproductive roles. Division of labour models elucidate how specialisation can emerge and evolve. Conceptual models from evolutionary developmental biology propose hypotheses for the origin and evolutionary fixation of a helper-phenotype. However, we argue that none of these three approaches is a sufficient explanation for the evolution of eusociality on its own. Consequently, we plead for novel unifying explanations and formal models to better understand the interrelation of reproductive altruism, task specialisation and phenotypic plasticity.

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Section: Behavioural and Morphological Specialisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Behavioural and Morphological Specialisationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The evolution of eusociality: Kin selection theory, division of labour models, and evo-devo explanations

Kreider¹,

Pen²

2022

Preprint

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“…The specialized roles within an ant colony, an orchestra, a sports team or sailing crew, or the production and flow of goods and services within a marketplace are all examples of complementarity. In economics, complementarity is most famously associated with the principles of "gains from trade" and Ricardian comparative advantage (Bowles, 2006b), and in sociology and evolutionary biology, with divisions of labor (Cooper, Frost, Liu, & West, 2021). In a game-theoretic context, we can capture this dynamic with two behavioral options, whose users benefit from interacting with unlike types.…”

Section: Coordination and Anti-coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why cultural distance can promote - or impede - group-beneficial outcomes

Beheim¹,

Bell²

2023

Preprint

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Quantifying the distance between cultural groups has received substantial recent interest. A key innovation borrowed from population genetics has been the calculation of cultural Fst (CFst) statistics (Bell, et al. 2009) on datasets of human culture. Measuring the variance between groups as a fraction of total variance, Fst's are theoretically important in additive models of cooperation, where they have positive marginal effects on selection for altruism. Consistent with this, recent empirical work has confirmed high values of pairwise CFst (measuring cultural distance) strongly predict unwillingness to cooperate with strangers in coordination vignettes. As applications for Fst increase, however, there is greater need to understand their meaning in naturalistic situations beyond additive cooperation. Traditionally studied in evolutionary game theory with models such as Stag Hunt, Hawk-Dove, Snowdrift, and Chicken, these interactions can be characterized by both positive and negative frequency-dependence, and by the presence of high-diversity, mixed equilibria. Abstracting across such games to a general model of linear synergy, we derive a simple relationship between Fst and the evolution of group-beneficial behaviors across a broad spectrum of social interactions. By making explicit the relationship between population structure and the evolutionary outcomes of social interactions with synergistic dynamics, we provide broader theoretical support for empirical applications of CFst, and motivate new questions in the evolutionary study of culture that bridge the topics of synergy, network associativity, the complexities of identity, and the paradox of cultural diversity.

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“…Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for studying the coupled dynamics of human and natural systems (Maynard Smith, 1982;Weibull, 1997;Stewart and Plotkin, 2014;Radzvilavicius et al, 2019;Park et al, 2020;Niehus et al, 2021;Han et al, 2021;Cooper et al, 2021). Furthermore, coevolutionary game models have recognized the fact that individual payoff values are closely related to the state of the environment (Weitz et al, 2016;Szolnoki and Chen, 2018;Chen and Szolnoki, 2018;Hauert et al, 2019;Tilman et al, 2020;Wang and Fu, 2020;Yan et al, 2021).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

Liu

Chen

Szolnoki

2022

Preprint

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Human society and natural environment form a complex giant ecosystem, where human activities not only lead to the change of environmental states, but also react to them. By using collective-risk social dilemma game, some studies have already revealed that individual contributions and the risk of future losses are inextricably linked. These works, however, often use an idealistic assumption that the risk is constant and not affected by individual behaviors. We here develop a coevolutionary game approach that captures the coupled dynamics of cooperation and risk. In particular, the level of contributions in a population affects the state of risk, while the risk in turn influences individuals' behavioral decision-making. Importantly, we explore two representative feedback forms describing the possible effect of strategy on risk, namely, linear and exponential feedbacks. We find that cooperation can be maintained in the population by keeping at a certain fraction or forming an evolutionary oscillation with risk, independently of the feedback type. However, such evolutionary outcome depends on the initial state. Taken together, a two-way coupling between collective actions and risk is essential to avoid the tragedy of the commons. More importantly, a critical starting portion of cooperators and risk level is what we really need for guiding the evolution toward a desired direction.

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The evolution of division of labour in structured and unstructured groups

Cited by 23 publications

References 51 publications

The evolution of eusociality: Kin selection theory, division of labour models, and evo-devo explanations

The evolution of eusociality: Kin selection theory, division of labour models, and evo-devo explanations

Why cultural distance can promote - or impede - group-beneficial outcomes

Coevolutionary dynamics via adaptive feedback in collective-risk social dilemma game

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