The evolution of emissions trading in the EU: tensions between national trading schemes and the proposed EU directive

Boemare, Catherine

doi:10.1016/j.clipol.2003.09.006

Cited by 15 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…In the Netherlands, long-term agreements on energy efficiency, which have been made with industry and other sectors since 1992, are expressed in energy consumption per physical unit of product. In the U.K., France and Germany, voluntary agreements on CO 2 include more relative than absolute targets (Boemare et al, 2003). In the U.S., in February 2003, the Bush administration announced a series of voluntary global warming agreements with the industry, most of which are expressed in greenhouse gas intensity (electric utilities, wood/paper industry, chemical industry, and cement industry) or energy intensity (oil and gas industry, iron and steel industry, railroad).…”

Section: Relative Emission Caps In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

Quirion

2005

Resource and Energy Economics

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Environmental policies often set "relative" or "intensity" emission caps, i.e., emission limits proportional to the polluting firm's output. One of the arguments put forth in favour of relative caps is based on the uncertainty on business-as-usual output: if the firm's production level is higher than expected, so will be business-as-usual emissions, hence reaching a given level of emissions will be more costly than expected. As a consequence, it is argued, a higher emission level should be allowed if the production level is more important than expected. We assess this argument with a stochastic analytical model featuring two random variables: the business-as-usual emission level, proportional to output, and the slope of the marginal abatement cost curve. We compare the relative cap to an absolute cap and to a price instrument, in terms of welfare impact. It turns out that in most plausible cases, either a price instrument or an absolute cap yields a higher expected welfare than a relative cap.Quantitatively, the difference in expected welfare is typically very small between the absolute and the relative cap but may be significant between the relative cap and the price instrument.

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Section: Relative Emission Caps In Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

Quirion

2005

Resource and Energy Economics

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“…There are also studies referring exclusively to interactions of different policies with the EU ETS (Blyth and Bosi 2004;Boemare et al 2003). Blyth and Bosi identify the options of linking non-EU domestic emissions trading schemes with the EU ETS and focus on implications of such linkages to design parameters of the hybrid schemes.…”

Section: General Studiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A framework on interactions of climate and energy policy instruments

Oikonomou

Jepma

2007

Mitig Adapt Strateg Glob Change

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“…Interactions were examined by Mavrakis et al under objectives, target groups, implementation network and rules-influencing mechanisms. Boemare et al (2003) examined the interactions between EU-ETS and negotiated agreements in France and the UK. Three forms of interaction were recognized by the three authors, direct, indirect and trading.…”

Section: The Policy Interaction Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi‐criteria evaluation of climate policy interactions

Konidari

Mavrakis

2006

Multi Criteria Decision Anal

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The effectiveness of a national climate policy instrument is affected by the presence of policy interactions with other instruments that were not forecasted before its implementation. The problem can be confronted during the design of the instrument by determining forms, types and size of emerging interactions. This paper presents a systematic approach for evaluating the aggregate effect of interactions using a combination of three multi-criteria methods, the analytical hierarchy process, the multi-attribute utility theory and the Simple Multi-Attribute Ranking Technique. The first is used for determining the weight coefficients for interaction forms and sub-criteria. The other two are used for grading policy interactions under a set of three criteria and their sub-criteria. The method is tested for two pairs of interactive instruments, IPPC and EU-ETS, EU-ETS and policies for the promotion of RES, within the Hellenic climate policy framework. Consistency and robustness tests are performed. Results are commented.

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The evolution of emissions trading in the EU: tensions between national trading schemes and the proposed EU directive

Cited by 15 publications

References 3 publications

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

Does uncertainty justify intensity emission caps?

A framework on interactions of climate and energy policy instruments

Multi‐criteria evaluation of climate policy interactions

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