The evolutionary game analysis of bidding for Chinese power enterprises

Wang, Zhufang; Xiong, Jiufeng

doi:10.1109/icife.2010.5609249

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…The higher its indications are, the better and more successful bidding strategy is. If the index value amounts to less than 1, it implies that the adopted strategy incurs losses (London Economics, 2007;Dun-nan et al, 2006;Wang and Xiong 2010). d) Analysis of success bidding.…”

Section: Analysis Of Earningmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Overview of Electricity Market Monitoring

Pinczyński

Kasperowicz

2016

Economics &Amp; Sociology

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ABSTRACT. The main goal of this paper is to present various aspects of electricity market monitoring and to focus on the monitoring of economic parameters, placing a special emphasis on market power, market performance and behavioral monitoring. This paper provides a view of the monitoring and its components. It presents available monitoring techniques and further it indicates the need to modify the existing structure or to develop a new structure of the monitoring system based on new indices which could be used by both operator and market participants.

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Section: Analysis Of Earningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The high index value implies that the adopted bidding strategy is highly successful (Dun-nan et al, 2006;David and Wen, 2000;Wang and Xiong 2010).…”

Section: Analysis Of Earningmentioning

confidence: 99%

Overview of Electricity Market Monitoring

Pinczyński

Kasperowicz

2016

Economics &Amp; Sociology

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“…The expected income when an agent participates in bidding can be expressed by u(l-L) ω-L(l-ω) = lω-L (Ying-Ying, 2007;Zhufang and Jiufeng, 2010;Ling et al, 2011). According to Wen and Shu-Hua (2006) and Ding and Jia (2001) the actual saved amount of project cost D, estimated by the agent in bidding, is uniformly distributed in a given range.…”

Section: Analysis Model For Adverse Selection Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of Adverse Selection for Motivation Mechanism in Engineering Project Cost Management

Lin¹,

Wang²,

Liu³

2013

RJASET

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When the principal-agent contracts for design, supervision and construction of an engineering project are signed, the agent and the principal have hidden information. By means of tendering and negotiation, etc., it selects an agent offering a lower quotation which leads to "Bad money drives out good", that is, commonly termed adverse selection problem. This study starts from the discussion of adverse selection and introduces a motivation mechanism to motivate the agent to exert initiative strategies more efficiently so that the agent can expose its hidden information automatically. The study also analyzes the project principal-agent strategies and finally uses a calculation example to demonstrate that the motivation mechanism in this study is efficient in inducing the agent to tell the truth, which aids the principal in selecting an agent with higher operational level.

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