The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent

Kaniovski, Serguei

doi:10.1007/s00355-007-0280-x

Cited by 34 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 34 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…The modeling approach described above has been proposed and developed in Kaniovski (2008) and Kaniovski and Das (2015). It allows calibrating an accurate model of the voting body given one's prior beliefs about the preferences of the members and the degree of commonality or rivalry among them.…”

Section: Winning Coalitions and The Analysis Of Decision Efficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union

2018

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This paper studies how voting rules affect the ease with which decisions are made, basing the analysis on the key premise that ideology makes some coalitions more likely to form than others. Our study focuses on the Council of the European Union (EU), where member states hold different voting weights and ideological positions are strongly linked to the affiliation of actors to political parties. Accordingly, to explore the influence of ideology on the probability of coalition formation, and to thus formulate a 'decision probability', we incorporate ideological positions in the analysis of efficiency of the voting system. For the case of the EU, we particularly consider the transition from the triple-majority voting system of the Nice Treaty to the double-majority system incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty. The standard assumption that member states vote independently and affirmatively with a probability of 0.5 leads to a more pessimistic view of the Council's decisionmaking capacity than does the premise that member state votes are biased towards voting with the Council majority. The latter assumption is supported by voting data and anecdotal evidence on the 'consensus-seeking' culture in the Council. Hence, * Madeleine O. Hosli

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Section: Winning Coalitions and The Analysis Of Decision Efficiencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union

2018

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“…We choose a particular distribution by imposing an additional criterion. Following Kaniovski (2008), we choose the distribution closest (using least squares) to the distribution in the case of independent votes. This is accomplished by solving the following quadratic optimization problem:…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform

et al. 2011

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Changing the composition and voting system of the Security Council, in an effort to increase the institution's global legitimacy, is proving to be one of the most difficult hurdles to overcome for the global community of states represented in the United Nations (UN). This paper demonstrates that due to institutional hurdles, it is considerably more difficult today than it was in the early years of the UN to reach a winning coalition in the General Assembly to secure Security Council reform. In addition, the paper analyzes the effects that adapted patterns of voting, as prescribed by recent reform proposals, would have on the distribution of power among UN member states in the Security Council and on the probability that this institution can form a winning coalition, i.e., reach decisions. Our power and decision capacity computations are based on (modified) Penrose-Banzhaf-Coleman measures.

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“…Ce mod ele binaire est le cadre habituel d'application de la th eorie des indices et nous oblige a ignorer toute autre consid eration. L'avantage fondamental du 24 Le probl eme de la corr elation entre les votes est etudi e de fa con abstraite par certains auteurs comme par exemple Kaniovski (2006). …”

Section: Notation Et Hypoth Eses Principalesunclassified

Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820

Breton¹,

Lepelley²

2014

Revue Économique

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Nous exploitons dans cet article la th eorie des indices de pouvoir pour evaluer les in uences respectives des deux classes d' electeurs dans le mode de scrutin instaur e par la loi electorale du 29 juin 1820, dite loi du \double vote". Nous montrons, a l'aide d'un mod ele simpli e, que le pouvoir de vote des \grands" electeurs, qui votent deux fois, est au moins trois a quatre fois sup erieur a celui des \petits" electeurs, qui ne votent qu'une fois. Le mod ele propos e constitue a certains egards une extension de celui qu'Edelman (2004) a r ecemment utilis e pour etudier les situations dans lesquelles certains electeurs appartiennent a plus d'un coll ege electoral.Classi cation JEL : D71, D72. Mots cl es : Elections, Vote, Pouvoir de vote.Les auteurs remercient particuli erement Philippe Mongin, dont la lecture attentive et les remarques ont permis d'am eliorer signi cativement la pr esentation des id ees et r esultats de cet article.Les auteurs remercient egalement deux arbitres de lecture de leurs rapports approfondis, P. Edelman d'avoir communiqu e certains de ses travaux sur des questions voisines ainsi que les participants a la conf erence de l'ADRES de leurs commentaires et suggestions. Ils remercient en n L. Vidu d'avoir conduit des simulations portant sur l' evaluation du pouvoir o u la corr elation des votes des electeurs votant deux fois est prise en compte. Elles sont consign ees dans Vidu (2011).

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The exact bias of the Banzhaf measure of power when votes are neither equiprobable nor independent

Cited by 34 publications

References 34 publications

Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union

Vote Probabilities, Thresholds and Actor Preferences: Decision Capacity and the Council of the European Union

Squaring the circle? Collective and distributive effects of United Nations Security Council reform

Une analyse de la loi électorale du 29 juin 1820

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