2017
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-42902-1_73
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The Existence of Equilibria in the Leader-Follower Hub Location and Pricing Problem

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Cited by 4 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…They formulated the problem as a bilevel nonlinear MIP problem and proposed a heuristic as a solution approach. Furthermore, Čvokić et al [6] demonstrated the existence of the unique Stackelberg and Nash pricing equilibria by proposing a model where two competitors (the leader and follower) are sequentially creating their hub and networks and setting prices. A new hub-and-center transportation network problem for a new company competing against an operating company was introduced by Niknamfar et al [19].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They formulated the problem as a bilevel nonlinear MIP problem and proposed a heuristic as a solution approach. Furthermore, Čvokić et al [6] demonstrated the existence of the unique Stackelberg and Nash pricing equilibria by proposing a model where two competitors (the leader and follower) are sequentially creating their hub and networks and setting prices. A new hub-and-center transportation network problem for a new company competing against an operating company was introduced by Niknamfar et al [19].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%