The explanatory power of local miracle compatibilism

Abstract

Local miracle compatibilists claim that we are sometimes able to do otherwise than we actually do, even if causal determinism obtains. When we can do otherwise, it will often be true that if we were to do otherwise, then an actual law of nature would not have been a law of nature. Nevertheless, it is a compatibilist principle that we cannot do anything that would be or cause an event that violates the laws of nature. Carl Ginet challenges this nomological principle, arguing that it is not always capable of explaining our inability to do otherwise. In response to this challenge, I point out that this principle is part of a defense against the charge that local miracle compatibilists are committed to outlandish claims. Thus it is not surprising that the principle, by itself, will often fail to explain our inability to do otherwise. I then suggest that in many situations in which we are unable to do otherwise, this can be explained by the compatibilist's analysis of ability, or his criteria for the truth of ability claims. Thus, the failure of his nomological principle to explain the falsity of certain ability claims is no strike against local miracle compatibilism.

On the notion of free will in the Free Will Theorem

“…Either way, as a considerable literature suggests (e.g., Fischer, 1994;Beebee, 2003;Oakley, 2006;Graham, 2008;Pendergraft, 2011;Berofsy, 2012;Dorr, 2016;Ismael, 2016), the tension between determinism and freedom remains worrying. To relax it, I present a simple mathematical framework that captures the spirit of compatibilist free willà la Lewis, including the idea of agency (which is an important aspect of free will).…”

The Consequence Argument and the Possibility of the Laws of Nature Being Violated

“…Cutter points out that this restricted thesis cannot be reasonably called "incompatibilism" because it violates the main desideratum. That is, the restricted thesis may be accepted by paradigmatic compatibilists, namely, those who support Lewis's response to the consequence argument (Graham 2008;Lewis 1981;Oakley 2006;Pendergraft 2010).…”