The failed Western challenge to Russia’s revival in Eurasia?

Abstract

The current crisis in Russia's relations with the West has more often than not been blamed in the West on Russia itself and the authoritarian policies pursued by Vladimir Putin. As reprehensible as many aspects of Russian policy might be, the West has contributed to the deterioration in the relationship by ignoring Russian policy concerns and attempting to take advantage of Russian weakness. By acting thus the West has not only created major problems for itself. It has also made any diplomatic solution to the Ukraine tragedy increasingly unlikely.

Taking interaction seriously: Asymmetrical roles and the behavioral foundations of status

“…In fact, however, Western politicians and observers viewed Russian prestige as being in decline. As Russia had failed to modernize according to their expectations, Western governments, above all the US administrations, sensed less and less need for deferring to its views, wishes, or rights (Kanet, 2015: 506). Hence, NATO leaders scarcely hesitated to initiate air strikes against Serbia in the face of Russian opposition.…”

“…In this view, invading the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine put an effective end to Western ideas that the Kremlin would keep deferring to Western interference in Russia’s sphere of influence (Kanet, 2015: 509–516; Lavrov, 2014c; Lo, 2015: 25, 48; Marten, 2015). While the intervention may have tarnished Russia’s international prestige (Götz, 2017: 238), this was apparently considered a price worth paying for restoring its overall status as a power that could not be pushed around (Clunan, 2014: 288–289; Lukyanov, 2016).…”

“…Discussions that focus on SIT’s status conceptualization miss most of these dynamics because they assume that Russia primarily aspires to attain recognized status markers or to gain access to a specific status group. Yet, the Russian leadership has long shed any ambition to improve Russia’s rank by joining the group of “advanced Western democracies” (Kanet, 2015: 518–519). Nor does it place much emphasis on the country’s G8 membership.…”

“…“This country,” former Prime Minister Primakov (2006) vowed, “will not agree to the status of a state that is ‘led.’” To feel respected, Russia’s current leadership wants to be treated “as an equal partner” of America, the only NATO country it sees as having a foreign policy which deserves that name (Putin, 2008). This seems far more important than acquiring status markers that merely enhance Russia’s international prestige (Ambrosio, 2005: chs 8–9; Kanet, 2015: 507–508; Mankoff, 2009: 134; Sakwa, 2015: 571–574; Stent, 2014: 25, 48, 255–259).…”

Prevention of Armed Conflict in Europe: Comparing the Role of the EU and the US/NATO

“…What role did the EU and the US/NATO play in the War in Donbass? While some experts have attributed the war wholly to Russian belligerence (e.g., Foreign Affairs, 2014; Wilson, 2015;Grant, 2016), a strong case can be made that both the EU and the US/NATO bear some responsibility as well (see the accounts in Mearsheimer, 2014;Kanet, 2015;Menon & Rumer, 2015;Chengyi, 2017;and Sauer, 2017). To understand why, it is necessary to chart the events that led up to the Euromaidan protests.…”