The failures of functionalism (for memory)

Abstract

In Memory: A Self-Referential Account, Fernández offers a functionalist account of the metaphysics of memory, which is portrayed as presenting significant advantages over causal and narrative theories of memory. In this paper, I present a series of challenges for Fernández’s functionalism. There are issues with both the particulars of the account and the use of functionalism more generally. First, in characterizing the mnemonic role of episodic remembering, Fernández fails to make clear how the mental image type that plays this role should be identified. Second, I argue that a functionalist approach, which appeals to the overall structure of the memory system and tendencies of mental state types, is ill-suited to the metaphysical question about episodic remembering that is of interest to the causal and narrative theorists with which Fernandez engages. Fernández’s self-referential account of memory has many other virtues, but functionalism is a poor fit for episodic remembering.

Defending functionalism and self-reference in memory

“…The two specific concerns about the functionalist account of remembering stem from this general worry. Robins (2021) 4 I therefore disagree with the view (Searle, 1983) claims that the functionalist treatment of the Embellishment case, and the functionalist treatment of the Confabulation case, are not satisfactory due to this shortcoming in the functionalist account. Robins considers various readings of the claim that having mental image i plays a functional role in the subject with regards to the fact that p, and concludes that none of them can deliver a satisfactory account of our intuitions about remembering in both Embellishment and Confabulation.…”

“…There is an interesting common factor in some of the objections raised by James (2021), Viera (2021) and Robins (2021). The common factor is that all three commentators are targeting, not tangential aspects of, but fundamental assumptions in the self-referential account of memory proposed in the book.…”

“…Nevertheless, the counterfactual is satisfied, which captures, I suggest, the intuition that the subject is (incorrectly) remembering that a black rabbit was shot. Robins (2021) objects that the fact that, in Embellishment, the counterfactual is satisfied does not allow us to reach any conclusions about the tendencies that the mental image of the black rabbit being shot has in the subject. This seems right.…”

“…Sarah Robins (2021) discusses the functionalist account of remembering proposed in the book, and she raises four worries for the account. Two of those worries are general worries, and two of them are more specific ones.…”

Experimental philosophy of memory

“…Versions of causalism designed to address problems for the classical causal theory have proliferated in recent years (e.g.,Michaelian, 2011a;Perrin, 2021; Sutton & O'Brien forthcoming;Werning, 2020); some of these (e.g.,Bernecker 2008Bernecker , 2010Debus, 2010) are designed primarily to address conceptual problems and thus may provide suitable targets for experimental philosophy.4 Fernández' argument for the functionalist theory of memory(Fernández, 2018(Fernández, , 2019(Fernández, , 2020(Fernández, , 2021a, which is distinct from both the causal theory and the simulation theory, appeals explicitly to our intuitions about hypothetical cases and may thus be of interest to experimental philosophers. SeeAndonovski (2021),James (2021),Robins (2021), andViera (2021) for objections to the functionalist theory.5 Causalism is standardly taken to align with discontinuism and simulationism with continuism, but seeLangland-Hassan (2021) and Sant'Anna (2021) for more nuanced takes on the relationship between the two pairs of views.6 The edited collections cited above focus primarily on the metaphysics of memory. SeeSenor (2019) for a systematic treatment of the epistemology of memory.…”