This document is the author's final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. breakdown for developed countries. We are not aware of an alternative database providing such information. This was also confirmed by several academic and practitioner experts on privatisation whom we contacted during the course of this research. iv Which includes transportation, water and sewerage, telecommunications, natural gas transmission and distribution, and electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. v Which includes agribusiness, cement, chemicals, construction, steel, hotels, tourism, airlines, maritime services and other sub-sectors that are not infrastructure or finance related. vi Which includes banks, insurance, real estate, and other financial services. vii Which includes the exploration, extraction, and refinement of hydrocarbons, oil, and natural gas. viii Which includes the extraction, refinement and sale of primary minerals and metals such as coal and iron ore. ix The ownership pattern resulting from privatisation often depends on the mode of privatisation chosen. Thus, private sale usually leads to concentrated strategic owners while mass privatisation usually generates widespread ownership at least initially. The impact of mode of privatisation on national economic performance in transition economies is explored in Bennett, Estrin and Urga (2007). x Note however that in the utilities sector, water in particular, the technology and the nature of the product restrict the possibility of competition in the market and therefore the efficiency gains following privatisation. In this case, competition for the market (to win the contract or concession agreement) has to be organized. Given the ambiguous results of privatisation in noncompetitive markets in terms of improving economic performance (Megginson and Netter 2001), regulation may prove to be more effective (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006). xi Because the performance of privatised banks in the seven countries of the West African Economic and Monetary Union from 1990 to 1997 improved in the first year after privatisation but not after that. xii Improvements in performance in Nigeria were observed in fully divested banks but not in the ones where the government retained minority shareholdings. xiii Whereas competition is feasible in telecommunications markets, it is usually cost inefficient in the market for water services given the scale of the investment in network assets required to deliver the product. xiv Privatisation is also not associated with the profitability and efficiency of government-owned firms. xv Note however that this method may suffer from a trade-off with competition objectives since foreign firms may seek local monopoly power. Such sales may be accompanied by conditions with respect to technology transfer, domestic content of inputs, employment, environment etc.