The fall of a donor darling: the role of aid in Mali's crisis

Bergamaschi, Isaline

doi:10.1017/s0022278x14000251

Cited by 49 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 58 publications

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“…These structural problems are coupled with poorly implemented policies related to distribution, such as the inability to develop an efficient and sufficient private sector in the face of an aid-based rent seeking economy. 20 To be clear, Mali's wavering fragility is not caused directly by specific shocks, such as drought, coups, or regional conflict (Bergamaschi 2014). We see that Capacity is consistently above the general fragility trend line, which is indicative of a stability ceiling.…”

Section: Malimentioning

confidence: 80%

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Exiting the fragility trap: Rethinking our approach to the world's most fragile states

Carment¹,

Samy²

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.Abstract: Those fragile states whose stagnation is so tenacious despite generous aid programs, and substantial and costly interventions, are stuck in a 'fragility trap.' Caught in a low-level equilibrium, trapped states appear to be in a perpetual political and economic limbo that can last for years and in several cases, decades. Our goal is to determine those features that trapped states have in common, and compare changes in those features over time with states that have successfully exited. The paper unfolds in four parts. In the first part we examine key concepts underpinning fragility traps in addition to conducting a review of current theorizing. In the second part we present the results of our large sample analysis. In the third part we compare the results of our comparative case studies with findings from the large sample analysis. In the fourth and final section we conclude with a discussion on how our findings inform policy. 1 Our prior research on traps focused on examples of specific state transitions but did not explore the question of causes (Carment et al 2015).2 With a focus on Africa, Andrimihaja et al. (2011) found that not only do the continent's fragile states grow more slowly than non-fragile states, the probability that a fragile state in 2001 was still fragile in 2009 was 0.95. According to the authors, corruption, political instability and violence, insecure property rights, and unenforceable contracts conspire to create a 'slow-growth-poor-governance equilibrium trap' into which these most fragile states fall and which they denote as a fragility trap. They suggest growth focused aid will not work in such cases. 3 In our previous research we found that fragility correlated strongly with economic growth, aid to fragile states tended to be more volatile and many states tended to be over aided beyond their absorptive capacity (Carment, Samy and Prest 2008). We also found that aid focusing on state society relations tends to be neglected relative to building strong state capacity and authority. A key factor in determining long-term stability, namely legitimacy, is generally ignored in the policy process (Carment, Prest and Samy 2008).

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Section: Malimentioning

confidence: 80%

“…Mali was long considered, at least since the mid-1990s, a model of African democracy becoming an 'aid darling' in the process (Bergamaschi 2014). These assumptions were firmly undermined by the 2012 coup against President Amadou Toumani Touré in the midst of a major secessionist conflict.…”

Section: Malimentioning

confidence: 99%

Exiting the fragility trap: Rethinking our approach to the world's most fragile states

Carment¹,

Samy²

2017

WIDER Working Paper

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“…5 For the quote and more on the Mali attacks, see Associated Press (2015). 6 An extensive literature has by now emerged on the Mali conflict and its causes and consequences; for key events see Charbonneau and Sears (2014); for the backstory of failed international intervention see Bergamaschi (2014;see also Galy 2013). 7 For some detail on the behind-the-scenes pressures by France on Mali over intervention, see Jauvert and Halifa-Legrand (2013).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intervention at Risk: The Vicious Cycle of Distance and Danger in Mali and Afghanistan

Andersson¹,

Weigand

2015

Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding

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In crisis-hit countries, intensive risk management increasingly characterizes the presence of international interveners, with measures ranging from fortified compounds to 'remote programming'. This article investigates the global drive for 'security' from an ethnographic perspective, focusing on Afghanistan and Mali. By deploying the concepts of distance and proximity, the article shows how frontline 'outsourcing' and bunkering have generated an unequal 'risk economy' while distancing interveners from local society in a trend that itself generates novel risks. To conclude, the article asks whether alternative forms of proximity may help to break the vicious cycle of danger and distance at work in today's crisis zones.

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“…1 Other works stressing the role of poor governance in generating the Malian crisis include Bergmaschi (2014), van Vilet (2013, Wing (2013), van de Walle (2012, and Dowd and Raleigh (2013 20 A snowball sample is a method in which existing participants recruit future participants from among people whom they know. In this case, we were asking participants to identify other IDPs.…”

Section: Competing Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%