The Fallacy of the Principle of Procreative Beneficence

Abstract

The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected.

What is the harm in harmful conception? On threshold harms in non-identity cases

“…For although this is not always the case, such statements often come with a qualifier that warns against the creation of lives that are ‘empty of all the things that make life worth living’ [2], ‘dominated by pain and suffering’ [3], ‘intractably miserable’ [4], ‘not worth living’ [5], ‘worse than no life at all’ [6]. This qualifier can be found in the works of many authors who write on the non-identity problem.…”

“…We have in mind cases in which a foetus or embryo is likely to become an individual whose life is variously described in the philosophical literature as ‘empty of all the things that make life worth living’ [2], ‘dominated by pain and suffering’ [3], ‘intractably miserable’ [4], ‘not worth living’ [5], or ‘worse than no life at all’ [6]. …”

Is procreative beneficence obligatory?

“…Some critics have found this puzzling, believing that there is a tension in arguing for a moral obligation while insisting that the state ought not to enforce it 6 11. I think these critics are mistaken.…”

When Intuition is Not Enough. Why the Principle of Procreative Beneficence Must Work Much Harder to Justify Its Eugenic Vision

“…4 Further, it has been argued that PPB necessarily puts a lower value on those with disability and encourages infringing reproductive autonomy. 5 This article, however, discusses what is perhaps PPB's and the arguments by Harris and Savulescu's most serious weakness, their failure to provide a definite account of the theoretical foundations for their positions.…”