The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Engelmann, Dirk; Strobel, Martin

doi:10.1007/bf01669774

Cited by 78 publications

(73 citation statements)

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“…Moreover, the two measures, r and r, are significantly positively correlated (Pearson correlation = 0.54, p < 0.01). The observed correlation is consistent with the so-called 'false consensus effect', that is, the tendency of people to overestimate the extent to which their beliefs, preferences and values are similar to those of others (see Mullen et al 1985 for an extensive metastudy on the false consensus effect and Engelmann and Strobel (2000) for a critical examination).…”

Section: Experiments Risk-bsupporting

confidence: 68%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

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Decisions about how to share resources with others often need to be taken under uncertainty regarding its allocational consequences. Although risk preferences are likely important, existing research is silent about how social and risk preferences interact in such situations. In this paper we provide experimental evidence on this question. In a first experiment givers are not exposed to risk while beneficiaries' final earnings may be larger or smaller than the allocation itself, depending on the realized state of the world. In a second experiment, risk affects the earnings of givers but not of beneficiaries. We find that individuals' risk preferences are predictive for giving inThe research documented in this paper was partly financed by the Oesterreichische Nationalbank (project number 11429) and also received financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) (project number 400-09-451). Uncertain (2017) 55:95-118 both experiments. Increased risk exposure of beneficiaries tends to decrease giving whereas increased risk exposure of givers has no effect. We propose a simple nonlinear generalization of a model allowing for other-regarding preferences, ex-post and ex-ante fairness, and risk aversion. We find some support for it in our data when risk is on the beneficiaries' side but less so when risk is on the givers' side. Our results point to the importance of the further development of models of social preferences that also incorporate risk preferences. Electronic supplementary material

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Section: Experiments Risk-bsupporting

confidence: 68%

Giving in the face of risk

2017

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“…If this is the case it suggests that in order to reduce the consensus effect both the effect of selective exposure (sample selection bias) and motivational factors have to be overcome. This complements Engelmann and Strobel's (2000) finding that a false consensus effect only disappears if information about other people is presented to subjects on a silver platter, such that no cognitive effort is needed to use relevant information.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 72%

“…A clever experiment by Engelmann and Strobel (2000) was explicitly designed to examine whether the consensus effect is false. In each session 16 subjects had to make a choice between two options.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opinions on the Tax Deductibility of Mortgages and the Consensus Effect

2007

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SummaryWe present the results of a survey-experiment -using a representative sample of the Dutch population -in which we relate respondents' opinion about a restriction of the tax deductibility of mortgages to their estimates about other people's opinions. We find a strong consensus effect; meaning that respondents' estimates of others' opinions are related to their own opinion. Furthermore, we find that the size of the effect is not affected by the ambiguity of the question posed. The provision of arguments pro and contra the tax provision and monetary incentives for accuracy reduce the consensus effect, but only so in conjunction. Finally, we find that house owners display a significantly stronger consensus effect. Our results suggest that both cognitive and motivational factors are responsible for the consensus effect. Aside from the consensus effect, our survey gives interesting insights into people's opinion on tax deductibility of mortgages. A majority consider a general restriction to be unfair, but a proposal to restrict only mortgages as of a certain size meets with much more approval.

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“…Other researchers additionally allow for differences in prior beliefs in the specification of types of agents (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008). Systematic differences in the within and cross game beliefs of trustors and trustees who behave differently provide support for the latter modeling strategy irrespective of whether or not such a pattern of choices and beliefs is labeled as a manifestation of the false-consensus effect (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000).…”

Section: Beliefs Of Trustors and Trustees Conditioned On Choicementioning

confidence: 99%

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

Levati

Miettinen

Rai

2011

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs (between-subjects and within-subjects) used to conduct experiments may fail to sufficiently account for this concern. An alternative design for laboratory experiments is proposed which may alleviate this concern especially in studies of social preferences. The proposed design is used to answer some questions that have attracted continued attention in the literature on social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular. Terms of use: Documents in

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The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given

Cited by 78 publications

References 10 publications

Giving in the face of risk

Giving in the face of risk

Opinions on the Tax Deductibility of Mortgages and the Consensus Effect

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

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