The Federal Dilemma: Organisational Strategies and the Consolidation of Parties in Mexico and Argentina

Abstract

What accounts for the consolidation of party organisations? The specialised literature has stressed the importance of institutions in shaping the ways in which political parties organise. However, little attention has been paid to the role of federalism. We argue that in federal settings, party territorial organisational strategies condition their capacity to become consolidated parties. We illustrate our theory with an analysis of the development of conservative parties in Argentina and Mexico to explain their different levels of consolidation.

Mudding the playing field. Fiscal contributions to municipalities as a political construction

“…Transferring funds to the former, the President assists partisan aligned mayors who might be receiving fewer political funds because of a parallel “punishment” taking place by the governor toward opposition local governments. Recent studies have underscored the existence of explicit challenges from mayors toward their governors, becoming provincial opposition members (Došek & Varetto, 2020; Olmeda & Suarez‐Cao, 2017). Furthermore, by encroaching on an opponent governor's province, the executive strengthens the national ruling party.…”

Las facultades colegislativas de los gobernadores en el constitucionalismo subnacional argentino

“…6 SAWERS (1996) y JONES et al (1997) y (2000. 7 JONES (1998 y 2002), BENTON (2003), LEIRAS (2010) OLMEDA y SUÁREZ (2007). 8 JONES y HWANG (2005).…”

Conflict or Cooperation? Political Relations between Governors and Mayors in Major Cities in Argentina

“…The few that do exist almost exclusively claim that mayors depend on their respective provincial governments (Eaton, 2004; Fenwick, 2010), notably for fiscal resources, and that it can therefore be expected that they are aligned with the governors. Some works, however, argue that mayors have had a growing role in the past two decades (Eryszewicz, 2015; Cravacuore, 2016) and that mayors of major (capital) cities in particular can come to defy provincial executives and even constitute an opposition (De Luca, 2008; Gibson, 2013; Olmeda and Suárez‐Cao, 2017).…”