INTRODUCTIONThis chapter focuses on metacognition and one particular aspect of it, namely, metacognitive experiences (ME). A question that immediately comes to mind is why metacognition, which is a cognitive phenomenon, is included in a book on motivation. First of all, the functional approach to motivation, which is basic in this book, requires the study of the interaction of motivation with cognition. Sorrentino and Higgins (1986) were pioneers in this approach, which gave significant insights in motivational research. However, cognition may take various forms and cannot be fully understood unless metacognition is taken into consideration. Metacognition has to do with awareness of cognition, that is, what we know about cognition, and is closely tied to consciousness and self-regulation. The question is if metacognition forms part of the mechanism that explains the operation of motivation and selfregulation, and if yes, what it accomplishes.One way of introducing metacognition into motivational research and theory is to ask if metacognition, as a dependent variable, is affected by motivational variables besides the cognitive ones, and, secondly, if metacognition, as independent variable, effects behavior and even one's affect. In the latter case, metacognition assumes motivational and/or self-regulatory power. In what follows, we shall provide evidence to support this double nature of metacognition, based on studies carried out in the School of Psychology at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Greece. We shall argue that metacognition, in the form of metacognitive experi-
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