<p>Saaty (2011) briefly discusses the three basic laws of Aristotelian logic and suggests a fourth, which he calls the Law of Comparisons. He argues that comparison is both relevant and essential<em> </em>to the other three laws and, in fact, precedes them. This view - comparativism - is however, not without criticism. Here we present a more comprehensive discussion of various problems regarding comparability, focusing on three aspects; (i) the problem of a proper scale; (ii) the problem of a proper aggregation of conflicting criteria and (iii) the debate whether values are subjective or objective. The debate regarding incomparability is varied and intense making a perfunctory or uncritical acceptance of comparativism wrong. However, Saatian Comparativism will be shown to be a solution to the major issues raised by incomparativists. Two conclusions are reached; (i) Saaty’s (2011) view is confirmed and (ii) the work of Saaty is not reflected in the incomparability or incommensurability literature and this debate stands to be enriched by seriously considering Saatian Comparativism.</p>