2017
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2920030
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The Financing of Local Government in China: Stimulus Loan Wanes and Shadow Banking Waxes

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Cited by 24 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…The results can be found inTables A2 and Table A3of the Appendix 15. As is expected, the coefficients on the first lags are generally much larger and have larger p-values than those on the second and third lags 16. In the factor analysis, the estimated weights on liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, profitability ratio and bad loan ratio are 0.835, 0.952, -0.112 and -0.866, respectively.…”
supporting
confidence: 57%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The results can be found inTables A2 and Table A3of the Appendix 15. As is expected, the coefficients on the first lags are generally much larger and have larger p-values than those on the second and third lags 16. In the factor analysis, the estimated weights on liquidity, capital adequacy ratio, profitability ratio and bad loan ratio are 0.835, 0.952, -0.112 and -0.866, respectively.…”
supporting
confidence: 57%
“…15 Since, as mentioned above, liquidity, capital adequate ratio, profitability and bad loan ratio have strong correlations with each other, we employ a factor analysis to construct one index titled banking health ratio (HEA) in the regression model. 16 Table 2 shows that As a whole, the results reported in Table 2…”
Section: Dynamic Panel Regression Resultsmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…As we discussed before, local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) continued to grow after the stimulus program ended in 2010 and needed to pay back their bank loans. Chen, He, and Liu (2017) argue that the rollover pressure precipitated the rapid growth of the shadow banking system, through which LGFVs were able to roll over their debt. 17 See Hachem (2017) for more detailed reviews on the growing literature on China's shadow banking and Zhu (2017) for an analysis on its welfare implications.…”
Section: Financial Institutionsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our decision-makers are listed Chinese corporations, which operate in a highly levered economic system (Xiong (2018); Song and Xiong (2018); Hachem and Song (2016); Chen, He, and Liu (2017)). Business groups often use intra-group transfers to allocate resources from public companies to private related parties (e.g., Berkman, Cole, and Fu (2009); Jia, Shi, and Wang (2013); Gopalan, Nanda, and Seru (2007)).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%