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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Tariffs and Imports Mis-invoicing under Oligopoly Terms of use: Documents in Amit K. Biswas Sarbajit Sengupta T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i t ä t D r e s d e n V i s v a B h a r a t i U n i v e rsity 1 0 6 2 D r e s d e nS a n t i n i k e t a n , W e s t B e n g a l Amit.Biswas@mailbox.tu-dresden.de sarbajitsengupta@gmail.comAbstract:Mis-match of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial mis-invoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in LDCs. In this paper we focus on the import under-invoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of under-invoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.JEL-Classification: F12, F13, L13
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Tariffs and Imports Mis-invoicing under Oligopoly Terms of use: Documents in Amit K. Biswas Sarbajit Sengupta T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i t ä t D r e s d e n V i s v a B h a r a t i U n i v e rsity 1 0 6 2 D r e s d e nS a n t i n i k e t a n , W e s t B e n g a l Amit.Biswas@mailbox.tu-dresden.de sarbajitsengupta@gmail.comAbstract:Mis-match of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial mis-invoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in LDCs. In this paper we focus on the import under-invoicing due to high tariff barriers in a market where domestic producers compete with importers. Specifically, we examine how tariff levels, market structure and government intervention (in the form of intensity of monitoring and severity of penalties) affect the levels of under-invoicing. We also look at the optimal levels of import tariff and instruments of government intervention in these circumstances.JEL-Classification: F12, F13, L13
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Fiscal federalism and foreign transfers: Does interjurisdictional competition increase foreign aid effectiveness?* This paper empirically studies the impact of decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition on foreign aid effectiveness. For this purpose we examine a commonly used empirical growth model, considering different measures of fiscal decentralization. Our panel estimations reveal that expenditure decentralization and inter-jurisdictional competition -reflected by the degree of tax revenue decentralization -negatively impact aid effectiveness. We therefore conclude that donor countries should carefully consider how both anti-poverty instruments -foreign assistance and decentralization -work together. Terms of use: Documents in Christian Lessmann Gunther Markwardt T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i t ä t D r e s d e n T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i tätJEL-Classification: O1; O2; O4; H7
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Should subsidies to urban passenger transport be increased? A spatial CGE analysis for a German metropolitan area Terms of use: Documents in Stefan Tscharaktschiew Georg Hirte T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i t ä t D r e s d e n T e c h n i s c h e U n i v e r s i tät Dresden Chair of Spatial Economics & Regional Science Chair of Spatial Economics & Regional Science 0 1 0 6 2 D r e s d e n 0 1 0 6 2 D r e s d e n D r e s d e n stefan.tscharaktschiew@tu-dresden.de georg.hirte@tu-dresden.deAbstract:The objective of this paper is to examine efficiency, distributional, environmental (CO 2 emissions) and spatial effects of increasing different kinds of transport subsidies discriminating between household types, travel purposes and travel modes. The effects are calculated by applying a numerical spatial general equilibrium approach calibrated to an average German metropolitan area. In extension to most studies focusing on only one kind of subsidy, we compare the effects of different transport subsidies within the same unified framework that allows to account for two features not yet considered simultaneously in studies on transport subsidies: endogenous labor supply and location decisions. Furthermore, congestion, travel mode choice, travel related CO 2 emissions and institutional details regarding the tax system in Germany are taken into account. The results suggest that optimal subsidy levels are either small or even zero. While subsidizing public transport is welfare enhancing, subsidies to urban road traffic reduce aggregate urban welfare. Concerning the latter it is shown that making investments in urban road infrastructure capacity or reducing gasoline taxes may even be harmful to residents using predominantly automobile. In contrast, pure commuting subsidies hardly affect aggregate urban welfare, but distributional effects are substantial. All policies contribute to urban sprawl by raising the spatial imbalance of residences and jobs but the effect is relatively small. In addition, the policies induce a very differentiated pattern regarding distributional effects, environmental effects and benefits of landowners.JEL-Classification: H24; R13; R14; R20; R48; R51
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