The fog of UN Peacekeeping: Ethical Issues regarding the use of Force to protect Civilians in UN Operations

Abstract

Until the end of the twentieth century, UN peacekeepers were often prohibited from using force outside self-defense. With the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the back of their minds, UN officials have recently changed this policy. At present, peacekeepers in the Congo, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast and Haiti are explicitly authorized to use force to protect civilians. The new policy is essential in preventing new debacles but it raises a number of ethical questions for peacekeepers. Should the peacekeeper concentrate on the protection of the individual if such protection jeopardizes the community or the mission? Should the peacekeeper solely think in terms of rights and duties, or should he or she also consider consequences? How to deal with the issue of moral engagement versus self-control? Peacekeepers need direction to answer these ethical questions. Unfortunately, conventional locations for finding ethical direction do not provide the guidance that peacekeepers seek. Consequently, peacekeepers will often encounter situations of moral confusion which this article defines as 'the fog of UN peacekeeping'. The article explains the fog of UN peacekeeping by showing how traditional guidelines fail to provide ethical direction in current peacekeeping operations. Despite the absence of ethical guidelines, soldiers need to prepare for the 'fog of peacekeeping'. An approach for an adequate preparation in the existing ethical vacuum is offered at the end of the article.

The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military intervention

“…Since 2002, for instance, the UN's standing rules of engagement for peace operations have authorized the use of force 'to defend any civilian person who is in need of protection'. 107 removal of threats through negotiated (and sometimes coerced) disarmament. 108 In the absence of military doctrine, however, we lack a clear understanding of how these tasks should be accomplished.…”

Does quality matter? An evaluation of the relationship between United Nations peacekeepers and civil war violence

“…In addition, the standard reference documents that peacekeepers are asked to rely on in the field, such as operational mandates and rules of engagement, tend to lack sufficient guidance regarding when, why and how to use force during an operation (Blocq 2006). They also tend to provide a significant amount of leeway to local commanders on the ground, which may help or hinder operational effectiveness depending on whether they are willing to take robust action.…”

“…They also tend to provide a significant amount of leeway to local commanders on the ground, which may help or hinder operational effectiveness depending on whether they are willing to take robust action. Thus, when peacekeepers are confronted with a situation that may require the use of force, they risk finding themselves lost in what Daniel Blocq (2006) refers to as "the fog of UN peacekeeping" and then have little to fall back on aside from their own judgement. Since these kinds of choices will be faced by even the most capable peacekeepers, particularly in the absence of sufficiently timely or detailed orders, it seems reasonable to suggest that a truly excellent peacekeeper should also prefer action over inaction in such situations.…”

“…Although it is not perfect indicator, the level of respect for physical integrity rights in each country should serve as a reasonable proxy for all three of these factors. A number of studies have suggested that peacekeepers who identify with the need to protect civilians from harm on an ethical level are likely to be more motivated to act in the field (Blocq 2006;Blocq 2010;Franke 2003;Britt 2003;Galatino 2003;Maguen and Litza 2006;Troy 2017), which is a trait that is presumably more common in individuals from states that respect such rights rather than states that do not. Similarly, other studies have shown that the domestic policies of states necessarily inform their foreign policy behaviour abroad (Risse-Kappen 2016), particularly with regard to the protection and promotion of human rights (Sobek, Abouharb and Ingram 2006;Tomz and Weeks 2018;Peterson and Graham 2011;and Kreps and Maxey 2018).…”

“…62 Nonetheless, the combination of these two indicators should prove sufficient to distinguish between peacekeepers who are likely to be more or less effective at managing violence, with combat 62 The theoretical discussion contained in Chapter 3 argues that the incentive structures of UN peacekeeping personnel are informed by two key factors: their personal experiences while they are deployed in the field and the policy objectives of their home governments. Although the CIRI data used in this chapter is an imperfect proxy of these two factors, there is a large body of research that supports the idea that states with higher levels of respect for physical integrity rights should both conduct their foreign policies in a manner that upholds such rights and produce soldiers who are more likely to view the protection of civilians as being an ethical imperative (Blocq 2006;Blocq 2010;Franke 2003;Britt 2003;Galatino 2003;Kreps and Maxey 2018;Maguen and Litza 2006;Peterson and Graham 2011;Risse-Kappen 2016;Sobek, Abouharb and Ingram 2006;Tomz and Weeks 2018;Troy 2017). Although it would be desirable to model these factors more directly, such as by including data on the individual policies or national caveats of specific troop contributing countries, there is unfortunately a lack of publicly available data on this topic that would be suitable for use in the geospatial models contained in this chapter.…”