19Human observers can reliably report their confidence in the choices they make. An 20 influential framework conceptualizes decision confidence as the probability of a decision 21 being correct, given the choice made and the evidence on which it was based. This 22 framework accounts for three diagnostic signatures of human confidence reports, including 23 an opposite dependence of confidence on evidence strength for correct and error trials. 24However, the framework does not account for the temporal evolution of these signatures, 25because it only describes the transformation of a static evidence representation into choice 26 and the associated confidence. Here, we combine this framework with another influential 27 framework: the temporal accumulation of evidence towards decision bounds. We propose 28 that confidence at any point in time reflects the probability of being correct, given the choice 29and accumulated evidence up until that point. This model predicts a systematic time-30 dependence of all diagnostic signatures of decision confidence, most critically: an increase of 31 the opposite dependence of confidence on evidence strength and choice correctness with 32 time. We tested, and confirmed, these predictions in human subjects performing a random 33 dot motion discrimination task, in which confidence judgments were queried at different 34 points in time. We conclude that confidence reports track the temporal evolution of the 35 probability of being correct. 36
Author summary 37Humans are able to report a sense of confidence in the accuracy of a choice. An 38 influential framework states that confidence reflects the probability that a choice is correct. 39We combined human experimenting with computational modelling and extended this notion 40 in the time domain, thus to formally describe the dynamics of confidence. Both human data 41 and our model show that the sense of confidence depends on the point in time, at which it is 42 queried. We conclude that human confidence reports reflect the dynamics of the probability 43 of a choice being correct. 44