The Formation of Oversized Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies

Abstract

In parliamentary democracies, participating in government provides access to office perks and policy influence. Because of this, as Riker (1962) demonstrated, there is a powerful logic behind the formation of minimum winning coalitions. Thus, an important question is why we regularly observe oversized coalitions. While several theories of coalition formation have been proposed, few have been tested in competition with one another. This article offers a simultaneous test of five main theories of coalition formation using data from 24 countries over the period from 1955 to 1998. The weight of the evidence suggests that oversized governments form when maintaining coalition bargains is harder (Carrubba and Volden 2000). Also, there is mixed support for oversized governments forming when the largest party is smaller and more extreme (Crombez 1996), but not when the status quo policy is more extreme (Baron and Diermeier 2001) and not to secure upper-house majorities (Lijphart 1984;Sjölin 1993). Finally, while we descriptively observe oversized connected coalitions (Axelrod 1970), the logic behind their formation appears to differ from what Axelrod proposes.

Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?

“…Nevertheless, the US may seek out the support of UNSC members as insurance votes. It is well established in the vote-buying literature that oversized coalitions tend to be established (see, e.g., Volden and Carrubba, 2004).…”

Oversized Government Coalitions in Latin America

“…Although varied, the main explanations proposed to account for this paradox share one point in common: they all emphasize that the occupation of posts can be (2016) 10 (3) e0001 -5/31 compensated, or even replaced, by the implementation of policy agenda (LAVER and SCHOFIELD, 1998;STRØM and NYBLADE, 2007;VOLDEN and CARRUBBA, 2004). One initial explanation for this fact is that coalition members seek to reduce the conflicts between themselves.…”

“…First through a dichotomous variable given the value 01 whenever at least one of the coalition members could be removed without loss of a majority in the lower house. This is the conventional operationalization of surplus coalitions (CROMBEZ, 1996;MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, 2012;VOLDEN and CARRUBBA, 2004 …”

Party Alliances and Political Coalitions During the 2007 General Election in Lesotho

“…Recent work on political party alliances or coalitions in Africa includes that of Volden & Carruba (2004) Oyugi (2006) and Kadima (2006). Volden & Carruba (2004, p 521) comment on Ryker's much-debated notion of minimum winning coalitions, which they sum up as: 'if governments are office-seeking -meaning parties join governments in order to divide up the benefits of controlling the executive -governments should include just enough parties to assure majority support in the electing house … Oversized coalitions would simply divide the perks of office among more actors than necessary.'…”