The free-energy self: A predictive coding account of self-recognition

Apps, Matthew A. J.; Tsakiris, Manos

doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.01.029

Cited by 432 publications

(454 citation statements)

References 183 publications

(233 reference statements)

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“…A major difference between those two mechanisms is that predictive coding requires the existence of a hierarchical architecture, which potentially reintroduces the need for convergence areas at the top of this hierarchy. Besides, predictive coding involving interoception has been proposed to account for explicit self-processing and bodily illusions such as the rubber hand [16,88]. In the case of the implicit subjective frame we are discussing here, it is not clear what the predictions of the system could be.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

Park

Tallon‐Baudry

2014

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

194

138

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The report ‘I saw the stimulus’ operationally defines visual consciousness, but where does the ‘I’ come from? To account for the subjective dimension of perceptual experience, we introduce the concept of the neural subjective frame. The neural subjective frame would be based on the constantly updated neural maps of the internal state of the body and constitute a neural referential from which first person experience can be created. We propose to root the neural subjective frame in the neural representation of visceral information which is transmitted through multiple anatomical pathways to a number of target sites, including posterior insula, ventral anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala and somatosensory cortex. We review existing experimental evidence showing that the processing of external stimuli can interact with visceral function. The neural subjective frame is a low-level building block of subjective experience which is not explicitly experienced by itself which is necessary but not sufficient for perceptual experience. It could also underlie other types of subjective experiences such as self-consciousness and emotional feelings. Because the neural subjective frame is tightly linked to homeostatic regulations involved in vigilance, it could also make a link between state and content consciousness.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 97%

The neural subjective frame: from bodily signals to perceptual consciousness

Park

Tallon‐Baudry

2014

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

194

138

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The resultant feeling of ownership over the rubber hand has led to this paradigm being known as the ''rubber hand illusion'' (RHI). This effect demonstrates that the experience of one's body as one's own depends upon the brain's ability to compare and integrate signals from different senses in a probabilistic manner (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014;Limanowski & Blankenburg, 2013). In the case of the RHI, the brain detects the synchrony between the felt touch on the real hand and the seen touch on the rubber hand and infers from this matching that the felt touch must originate from the observed hand leading to the feeling of ownership over that hand.…”

Section: Bodily Selfmentioning

confidence: 95%

Putting Ourselves in Another’s Skin: Using the Plasticity of Self-Perception to Enhance Empathy and Decrease Prejudice

Farmer

Maister

2017

Soc Just Res

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The self is one the most important concepts in social cognition and plays a crucial role in determining questions such as which social groups we view ourselves as belonging to and how we relate to others. In the past decade, the self has also become an important topic within cognitive neuroscience with an explosion in the number of studies seeking to understand how different aspects of the self are represented within the brain. In this paper, we first outline the recent research on the neurocognitive basis of the self and highlight a key distinction between two forms of self-representation. The first is the ''bodily'' self, which is thought to be the basis of subjective experience and is grounded in the processing of sensorimotor signals. The second is the ''conceptual'' self, which develops through our interactions of other and is formed of a rich network of associative and semantic information. We then investigate how both the bodily and conceptual self are related to social cognition with an emphasis on how self-representations are involved in the processing and creation of prejudice. We then highlight new research demonstrating that the bodily and conceptual self are both malleable and that this malleability can be harnessed in order to achieve a reduction in social prejudice. In particular, we will outline strong evidence that modulating people's perceptions of the bodily self can lead to changes in attitudes at the conceptual level. We will highlight a series of studies demonstrating that social attitudes towards various social out-groups (e.g. racial groups) can lead to a reduction in prejudice towards that group. Finally, we seek to place these findings in a broader social context by considering how innovations in virtual reality technology can allow experiences of taking on another's identity are likely to become both more commonplace and more convincing in the future and the various opportunities and risks associated with using such technology to reduce prejudice.

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“…However, these probabilistic interpretations can become corrupted, and aberrant biases in this process can lead to disorders in the sense of presence, embodiment and self-awareness (Bechara & Naqvi, 2004;Clark, 2013;Critchley et al, 2004;Herbert, Herbert & Pollatos, 2011;Corlett, Frith & Fletcher, 2009;Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007;Corlett, Taylor, Wang, Fletcher & Krystal, 2010;Friston, 2005;2010;Seth, 2009;Seth et al, 2012;Tsakiris, Tajadura-Jiménez & Costantini, 2011; see also Apps & Tsakiris, 2014). These predictive process are legion, constantly unfolding and occurring throughout a distributed network and at all levels of a hierarchically organised neuromatrix mediating selfconsciousness.…”

Section: Theoretical Accountsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Disorders or discrepancies in this sense of presence are associated with many dissociative states and conditions (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014;Braithwaite, Broglia & Watson, 2014;Brugger, 2002;Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004;Sanchez-Vives & Slater, 2005;Seth, 2009;Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). One example is the dissociative condition known as depersonalization disorder (DPD).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%