2012
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2045436
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The Free Trade Agreement between the EU and Ukraine: Conceptual Background, Economic Context and Potential Impact

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Secondly, the acquis was viewed by Ukraine's reform‐minded elites as a blueprint for much needed modernization (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2015). Association with the EU was a vital stimulus for restructuring, opening the door to investment and technology flows not available from elsewhere (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012).…”
Section: Asymmetry and Politicization In The Context Of The Eu–ukrain...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Secondly, the acquis was viewed by Ukraine's reform‐minded elites as a blueprint for much needed modernization (Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2015). Association with the EU was a vital stimulus for restructuring, opening the door to investment and technology flows not available from elsewhere (Dabrowski and Taran, 2012).…”
Section: Asymmetry and Politicization In The Context Of The Eu–ukrain...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Vladimir Putin's reaction to the launch of the Eastern Partnership was to launch, in 2010, his own project for a Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), which was presented as an alternative source of integration for most of those same countries (Dreyer and Popescu, ; Stratfor , ). This was a direct challenge to the EU, since membership of the Russian customs union would prove incompatible with membership of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) that the European Commission was pressing on the six countries involved in the EP: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (Dabrowski and Taran, ). Instead of avoiding a beauty contest with the Kremlin over the rival attractions of these two options, the EU took the view that the partnership countries would simply have to choose.…”
Section: The European Neighbourhood Policy and The Ukraine Crisismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The most important is the introduction of the European technical standards as national (Section 4, Chapter 3, Article 56) and the maximum approximation of the laws of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Section 4, Chapter 4, Article 64). However, the Agreement framework also stated the approximation of legislation in other areas -public procurement (Section 4, Chapter 8, Article 153), competition (Section 4, Chapter 10, Article 256), statistical calculation (Section 5, Chapter 5, Article 356) , environmental protection (section 5, chapter 6, article 363), transport (section 5, chapter 7, article 368), electronic communication (section 5, chapter 14, article 394), consumer rights protection (section 5, chapter 20, article 417) [3].…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%