The function of morality

Smyth, Nicholas P.D.

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0746-8

Cited by 31 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Sometimes, the best explanation for an entity's emergence and persistence will be that it is disposed to produce some effect. When we have a reasonably complete and informative explanation of this sort, it seems reasonable to conclude that the entity's function is to produce those effects, on the assumption that the original enabling conditions haven't changed too much (Millikan 1984;Smyth 2016).…”

Section: Functional Misunderstandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A genealogy of emancipatory values

Smyth

2020

Inquiry

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Analytic moral philosophers have generally failed to engage in any substantial way with the cultural history of morality. This is a shame, because a genealogy of morals can help us accomplish two important tasks. First, a genealogy can form the basis of an epistemological project, one that seeks to establish the epistemic status of our beliefs or values. Second, a genealogy can provide us with functional understanding, since a history of our beliefs, values or institutions can reveal some inherent dynamic or pattern which may be problematically obscured from our view. In this paper, I try to make good on these claims by offering a sketchy genealogy of emancipatory values, or values which call for the liberation of persons from systems of dominance and oppression. The real history of these values, I argue, is both epistemologically vindicatory and functionally enlightening.

show abstract

Section: Functional Misunderstandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

A genealogy of emancipatory values

Smyth

2020

Inquiry

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These difficulties have been clearly brought out by Smyth's (2017) critique of inferences from the original function to the current function of morality. 25 Smyth argues that if ascriptions of current functionality on the basis of genealogy are to be warranted, the conditions relative to which something originally was functional must still obtain.…”

Section: Functionality and Continuitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…26 The key difficulty for function-oriented genealogies, then-the "functionalist's burden," as Smyth calls it-is that they presuppose 25 The genealogists Smyth focuses on are Kitcher (2011), Joyce (2006, Sinclair (2012), and Prinz (2007), though there is a suggestion that the same difficulties extend to Hume (2000) and Williams (2002). See Smyth (2017Smyth ( , pp. 1130n4, 1131.…”

Section: Functionality and Continuitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1130n4, 1131. 26 Smyth (2017Smyth ( , pp. 1137Smyth ( -1138 continuity in the conditions relative to which a practice is functional.…”

Section: Functionality and Continuitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The objection is that genealogies which try to derive current from original function suffer from continuity failure-they founder on the fact that the conditions in response to which something originated no longer obtain. 4 As Nicholas Smyth (2017) has recently argued in response to the genealogies of Richard Joyce (2006), Jesse Prinz (2007), and Philip Kitcher (2011), 5 ascriptions of current functionality on the basis of genealogy are warranted only if the conditions relative to which something was originally functional still obtain, and Smyth suggests that these genealogies founder on continuity failure.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

How genealogies can affect the space of reasons

Queloz

2018

Synthese

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can genealogical explanations affect the space of reasons? Those who think so commonly face two objections. The first objection maintains that attempts to derive reasons from claims about the genesis of something commit the genetic fallacy-they conflate genesis and justification. One way for genealogies to side-step this objection is to focus on the functional origins of practices-to show that, given certain facts about us and our environment, certain conceptual practices are rational because apt responses. But this invites a second objection, which maintains that attempts to derive current from original function suffer from continuity failure-the conditions in response to which something originated no longer obtain. This paper shows how normatively ambitious genealogies can steer clear of both problems. It first maps out various ways in which genealogies can involve non-fallacious genetic arguments before arguing that some genealogies do not invite the charge of the genetic fallacy if they are interpreted as revealing the original functions of conceptual practices. However, they then incur the burden of showing that the conditions relative to which practices function continuously obtain. Taking its cue from the genealogies of E. J. Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker, the paper shows how model-based genealogies can avoid continuity failures by identifying bases of continuity in the demands we face.

show abstract

Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation

Arvan

2021

Synthese Library

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Greene 2015; Tomasello and Vaish, 2013) is that moral cognition is a biological adaptation to foster social cooperation. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that moral cognition is likely an evolutionary exaptation (Gould, 1991): a form of cognition where neurobiological capacities selected for in our evolutionary history for a variety of different reasons-many unrelated to social cooperation-were put to a new, prosocial use after the fact through individual rationality, learning, and the development and transmission of social norms.My argument has three steps. First, I provide a brief overview of the emerging behavioral neuroscience of moral cognition. I then outline a theory of moral cognition that I have argued explains these findings better than alternatives (Arvan, 2020). Finally, I demonstrate how the evidence for this theory of moral cognition and human evolutionary history together suggest that moral cognition is likely not a biological adaptation. Instead, like reading sheet music or riding a bicycle, moral cognition is something that individuals learn to do-in this case, in response to sociocultural norms created in our ancestral history and passed down through the ages to enable cooperative living. This chapter thus aims to set evolutionary ethics on a new path, identifying the evolutionary function of moral cognition with a complex interplay between neurobiological and cultural evolution.

show abstract

The function of morality

Cited by 31 publications

References 23 publications

A genealogy of emancipatory values

A genealogy of emancipatory values

How genealogies can affect the space of reasons

Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About