The functional analysis of psychological terms: In defense of a research program

Abstract

In 1945, B. F. Skinner outlined a proposal that psychological or mentalistic terms found in natural language might be analyzed empirically in terms of the variables, conditions, and contingencies of which they may be observed to be a function. Such an analysis would enable discriminations to be made between different classes of variables that enter into the control of the term. In this way, the analysis would clarify what is traditionally called the "meanings" of such terms as they occur as properties of verbal behavior. Despite his expressed confidence in the success of such a program, Skinner largely abandoned the functional analysis of psychological terms in favor of the development of a promising new field; the experimental analysis of behavior. The present paper argues that the original program is of great importance as well, and for the following reasons: (a) to make full, immediate, and (most importantly) effective contact with the range of issues and terms of central importance to the traditionally and culturally important concepts of "mind" and "mental life" (and thereby demonstrating the relevance of radical behaviorism to the full range of human and verbal behavior); and (b) to extend the methodology of the functional analysis of verbal behavior more generally. Such a research program would demonstrate, through an empirically-based scientific analysis, that the philosophical problems concerning "mental life" may be productively analyzed as problems of verbal behavior. Issues of methodology are discussed, and possible methodological strategies are proposed regarding the confirmation of behavior analytic interpretations of mentalistic terms.

Radical Behaviorism and the Clarification of Causality, Constructs, and Confusions: A Reply to Hayes, Adams, and Dixon

“…They become, in other words, problems of verbal behavior (e.g., Leigland, 1996;Skinner, 1945Skinner, , 1957. Such problems would not be "solved" by such a scientific analysis, as any "solution" would necessarily involve the direct engagement of the very vocabulary that has framed the problem.…”

“…Note that from the perspective of radical behaviorism, at exactly what point we decide to call any of these factors a "cause" is nothing discriminable characteristics) of verbal interactions which may be subjected to a scientific analysis (e.g., Leigland, 1996;Skinner, 1945; ct. Rorty, 1989Rorty, , 1991. Nevertheless, Hayes et al (1997) appear to engage the issue of "existence" in full ontological literality, as shown in the following passages: "In some cases, confusion occurs ... because the events, in fact, do not have any actual existence' (p. 99; emphasis added), and from the passage quoted above, ''There are no such powers or forces, to be found among the events themselves, however, and neither do events exist in classes" (p. 105; emphasis added).…”

A comprehensive science: A review of Moore’s Conceptual Foundations of Radical Behaviorism

“…One cannot be rid of ontological messes by using ontology and staying within the same language game; one only digs in deeper (''How do you know these things don't exist?''). Existence is just another term that is in need of a functional analysis of verbal behavior (Leigland, 1996).…”

A study in the founding of applied behavior analysis through its publications

“…As for the founding and first publication in the discipline's philosophy of science, it was Skinner's (1945b) article, ''The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms'' (Leigland, 1996;Moxley, 2001; see Day, 1969;Malone, 2009, p. 492;Pear, 2007, p. 134). In it, he made three contributions.…”