The Funding of Subsidiaries Equity, 'Double Leverage,' and the Risk of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs)

Bressan, Silvia

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2516208

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…362 Normally, when the ratio is higher than 100%, the parent is considered to have acquired significant stakes in the equity of subsidiaries by not holding sufficient capital (or capital of 361 sufficient quality) itself. 363 For example, credit rating agencies consider a double-leverage ratio of 115% or 120% as high. 364 The regulator obviously aims to take a more prudent approach.…”

Section: Potential Regulatory Implicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The EU supervisory and resolution framework for banks: an inquiry into the complexity and instability of bank groups

Biljanovska¹

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The dissertation explores to what extent the post-financial crisis EU resolution regime, based on equity/debt write-down and conversion powers and bail-in tools will be effective in maintaining the stability of bank groups. To arrive at its unique angle, it first asks why bank groups are considered complex, thereby explaining the reasons for their proliferation and instability, and how this may inform the view regarding a desired regulatory framework. The main observation the dissertation makes is that, notwithstanding of other factors already pointed out in the literature, bank groups adopt complex structures with multiple entities, as it allows them, inter alia, to use double-leverage financing structures and internal capital markets. Double-leverage financing structures allow bank groups to optimise the combination of their debt/equity funding from external parent entity investors with a combination of debt/equity funding downstreamed internally to subsidiaries and other entities in the bank group. An important component within this structure is also that the allocation of the bank group’s resources takes place through the internal capital market (ICM). The allocation of resources via the ICM allows bank groups to manage their liquidity constraint either to undertake activities that are more profitable, or to stabilise the financial position of the group as a whole. While both double leverage and ICMs can optimise the funding and allocation of resources of the bank group, respectively, they can also generate perils to the stability of the bank group. In particular, this is because double-leverage can result in excessive risk taking and regulatory arbitrage. Moreover, the allocation of the intra-group resources in the ICM may not maintain the financial health of all subsidiaries in the bank group, which can prove to be incompatible with the financial stability goals of the regulators in the countries where those subsidiaries conduct their business. Within this context, the dissertation argues that the current EU resolution regime does not clearly address issues of double leverage when setting out capital and other liability requirements, i.e. the ‘Total Loss Absorbing Capacity’ (TLAC) and ‘Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities’ (MREL) requirements. Moreover, the dissertation emphasis that it is equally relevant to clarify the way in which the bank group resources are available ahead of, and in financial distress. It is argued that to this end, bank groups need to be allowed to make use of the ICM as it is often uncertain what may be the cause of the financial distress and how the resources of the bank group could be used to stabilise it. To this end, the dissertation highlights that there is lack of clarity in both the ex-ante provisions on intra-group support framework and in the ex-post provisions governing the allocation of any surplus TLAC/MREL resources. Besides the ‘intra-group’ issues within the bank group, the third point the dissertation makes relation to the bank group’s presence in multiple jurisdictions. This transnational element adds to the complexity of the intra-group issues resulting from sub-optimal cooperation between home and host authorities. In this regard, the dissertation underlines that the current framework could adopt a more balanced way in which the regulatory fora will take into account the interest of the authorities of all parts of the bank group.

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Section: Potential Regulatory Implicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The EU supervisory and resolution framework for banks: an inquiry into the complexity and instability of bank groups

Biljanovska¹

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On the “double leverage” of US insurance groups

Bressan

2023

RGC

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We show that a high degree of “double leverage” inside US insurance groups affects in a negative way their financial strength. Double leverage occurs when the parent firm finances the purchase of subsidiaries’ equity using external debt proceeds, i.e., without changing its stand-alone capital. The previous evidence shows that the double leverage of US Bank Holding Companies leads the firms to become riskier (Bressan, 2018b) and less efficient (Bressan et al., 2021). While regulators give instructions for the assessment of double leverage inside banking groups, in the insurance sector this topic has not received enough attention from either regulators or scholars. This article aims to fill this lack of knowledge by using data from the balance sheets of US insurance groups during the years 2000–2021, showing that indicators for the solvency and the performance of insurers decrease significantly in measures of double leverage. These findings deliver important implications for future policymaking. As we analyze accounting data from consolidated balance sheets, we argue that regulators should more carefully consider whether consolidation rules are sufficiently informative about the financial stability of insurance groups. This is an important task in relation to the systemic relevance of insurance corporations. Finally, this article is a starting point for follow-up research testing, for example, the link of double leverage to captive insurance (Weterings, 2014) and reinsurance (Park & Xie, 2014; Bressan, 2018a).

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The Funding of Subsidiaries Equity, 'Double Leverage,' and the Risk of Bank Holding Companies (BHCs)

Cited by 2 publications

References 358 publications

The EU supervisory and resolution framework for banks: an inquiry into the complexity and instability of bank groups

The EU supervisory and resolution framework for banks: an inquiry into the complexity and instability of bank groups

On the “double leverage” of US insurance groups

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