The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting

Gilbert, Daniel T.; Gill, Michael J.; Wilson, Timothy D.

doi:10.1006/obhd.2001.2982

Cited by 296 publications

(249 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…[31][32][33][34][35][36][37] Focalism Focalism refers to focusing narrowly on what will change in one's life while ignoring how much of what one enjoys daily can still be continued. 4,32,38 Thus, Mr. Wishaw imagines himself constantly depressed because he cannot walk or run, and he does not think about enjoyable experiences that he can still have, like meals with his grandchildren.…”

Section: Problems Envisioning Future States Cognitive Distortions In mentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions

2008

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Patients facing medical decisions that will impact quality of life make assumptions about how they will adjust emotionally to living with health declines and disability. Despite abundant research on decision-making, we have no direct research on how accurately patients envision their future well-being and how this influences their decisions. Outside medicine, psychological research on "affective forecasting" consistently shows that people poorly predict their future ability to adapt to adversity. This finding is important for medicine, since many serious health decisions hinge on quality-of-life judgments. We describe three specific mechanisms for affective forecasting errors that may influence health decisions: focalism, in which people focus more on what will change than on what will stay the same; immune neglect, in which they fail to envision how their own coping skills will lessen their unhappiness; and failure to predict adaptation, in which people fail to envision shifts in what they value. We discuss emotional and social factors that interact with these cognitive biases. We describe how caregivers can recognize these biases in the clinical setting and suggest interventions to help patients recognize and address affective forecasting errors.

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Section: Problems Envisioning Future States Cognitive Distortions In mentioning

confidence: 99%

Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions

2008

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“…This impact bias-the tendency of people to overestimate the emotional impact of future events on their lives-has received ample empirical support. For example, it has been shown that romantic partners overestimate how bad they feel if their relationship ends, football fans overestimate their happiness after their team won a game, college students overestimate their negative emotions if they would be assigned to an ''undesirable'' dormitory, people gambling with money overestimate how unhappy they feel when they lose, professors overestimate their positive emotions following a positive tenure decision, and people taking their driver's license exam overestimate their disappointment after failing the exam (Dunn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2003;Finkenauer, Gallucci, Van Dijk, & Pollmann, 2007;Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998;Kermer, Driver-Linn, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2006;Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & Axsom, 2000; see also Buehler & McFarland, 2001;Gilbert, Gill, & Wilson, 2002;Gilbert, Lieberman, Morewedge, & Wilson, 2004;Gilbert, Morewedge, Risen, & Wilson, 2004;Loewenstein & Schkade, 1999;Sanna & Schwarz, 2004;Wilson, Meyers, & Gilbert, 2001.…”

Section: Affective Forecasting and The Impact Biasmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Misprediction of Emotions in Track Athletics: Is Experience the Teacher of all Things?

Dijk¹,

Finkenauer²,

Pollmann³

2008

Basic and Applied Social Psychology

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People commonly overestimate the intensity of their emotions toward future events. In other words, they display an impact bias. This research addresses the question whether people learn from their experiences and correct for the impact bias. We hypothesize that athletes display an impact bias and, counterintuitively, that increased experience with an event increases this impact bias. A field study in the context of competitive track athletics supported our hypotheses by showing that athletes clearly overestimated their emotions toward the outcome of a track event and that this impact bias was more pronounced for negative events than for positive events. Moreover, with increased athletic experience this impact bias became larger. This effect could not be explained by athletes' forecasted emotions, but it could be explained by the emotions they actually felt following the race. The more experience athletes had with athletics, the less they felt negative emotions after unsuccessful goal attainment. These findings are discussed in relation to possible underlying emotion regulation processes.

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“…It is easy to think of examples of how one forms selective expectations of events one has not yet experienced, based on information that is not accurate. Consider events such as marriage, childbirth or becoming tenured (often close to wishful or overly optimistic thinking, see Gilbert et al, 2002;Wilson and Gilbert, 2003;Bovi, 2009). A discrepancy between wanting and liking is then likely to follow.…”

Section: On the Divergence Between Wanting And Likingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Disentangling motivational and experiential aspects of “utility” – A neuroeconomics perspective

Witt¹,

Binder

2013

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractAlthough decision makers are often reported to have difficulties in making comparisons between multi-dimensional decision outcomes, economic theory assumes a uni-dimensional utility measure. This paper reviews evidence from behavioral and brain sciences to assess whether, and for what reasons, this assumption may be warranted. It is claimed that the decision makers' difficulties can be explained once the motivational aspects of utility ("wanting") are disentangled from the experiential ones ("liking") and the features of the different psychological processes involved are recognized.

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The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting

Cited by 296 publications

References 51 publications

Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions

Affective Forecasting: An Unrecognized Challenge in Making Serious Health Decisions

The Misprediction of Emotions in Track Athletics: Is Experience the Teacher of all Things?

Disentangling motivational and experiential aspects of “utility” – A neuroeconomics perspective

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