The G7, International Terrorism and Domestic Politics: Modeling Policy Cohesion in Response to Systemic Disturbance

Volgy, Thomas J.; Kanthak, Kristin; Ingersoll, Robert Stewart; Frazier, Derrick V.

doi:10.1080/03050620490492079

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…American relational strength is certainly sufficient for global leadership, both in the aggregate and on the basis of relative economic and military measures. Although it demonstrated a significant drop during the 1970-1985 period, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, U.S. relational strength shows to be at its highest since the 1950s, and exceeds in the aggregate 50% of all major power strength (Volgy et al 2004). 15 It is in this sense that the post-cold war order has been characterized as unipolar.…”

Section: [And Amentioning

confidence: 98%

Systemic Transitions

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: [And Amentioning

confidence: 98%

Systemic Transitions

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Katzenstein speculates that in the long run such strains are likely to profoundly alter alliance patterns. Already, evidence has surfaced that terrorism is undermining unity of purpose in target governments' foreign policies: Volgy et al (2004) find that foreign policy cohesion among the G7 countries has weakened as terrorist incidents have increased. 18 …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Why Iraq?*

Lowenberg

Mathews

2008

Defence and Peace Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The US claim that the invasion and occupation of Iraq was a necessary component of the war on terror has been roundly criticized in both popular and scholarly discourse, while many major US allies were unsupportive. However, the present article argues that the US strategy can be viewed as a rational approach to combating transnational terrorist attacks on the American homeland. By deploying a large, activist contingent of troops in a geographical location relatively close to the terrorists' base of operations, a target country can, under certain specified circumstances, successfully deflect terrorist attacks away from domestic civilians, even if the effect of such deployment is not directly to diminish the terrorists' capacity to launch attacks. The interaction between the target government and a terrorist organization is characterized as a sequential move game, the solution to which identifies the conditions under which a deflection strategy maximizes the expected payoff to the target government. It is shown that the deflection strategy makes most sense when the perceived cost of a terrorist attack on the homeland is high and when the target nation is militarily strong and confident of success, has a relatively small proportion of its domestic population that is sympathetic to the terrorists' cause, and is geographically distant from the main base of terrorist operations. Target countries for which one or more of these conditions are absent might be expected to rationally reject such a strategy.

show abstract