The GATT/ WTO Dispute Settlement System. International Law, International Organizations and Dispute Settlement

Abstract

Bewunderungswürdig ist andererseits, wie es durchweg gelungen ist, gerade bei schwieri gen Rechtsfragen Formulierungen zu finden, die ungeachtet aller Kontroversen doch jedenfalls als zutreffend gekennzeichnet werden können. Der handliche, sorgfältig edierte Band bietet dem interessierten Laien reichhaltige und zuverlässige Information und faßt für die wissenschaftliche Beschäftigung mit den Verein ten Nationen, aus welcher (sozial-)wissenschaftlichen Perspektive auch immer, das Basis wissen bündig zusammen -dies aktuell auf dem Stand Anfang eines Jahres, in dessen erster Hälfte sich dann Entwicklungen am UNO-Friedenssicherungssystem vorbei vollzogen, welche das Nachdenken über die Organisation und auch deren Umformung besonders dringlich vor Augen geführt haben.

GATT-Think

“…Nullification or impairment has been interpreted to include actions taken by one country "...which harmed the trade of another, and which 'could not reasonably have been anticipated' by the other at the time it negotiated for a concession" (Jackson, 1997, p. 115). As Petersmann (1997) details, a nullification-or-impairment complaint may take several forms. A "violation complaint" occurs when a country is alleged to have failed to carry out its GATT obligations (as when a tariff binding is broken), while a "non-violation complaint" occurs when there is no claim that the harmful action is itself inconsistent with GATT rules (as when a production subsidy is offered to domestic firms).…”

Untitled

“…Similar activities were reported in Germany, where domestic courts followed the practice of recognising the direct applicability and enforceability of at least part of WTO law (i.e. the direct effect of TRIPS Agreement was recognized) (see Petersmann, 1997). Nevertheless, from the 1980s, Italy's Corte di Cassazione (Court of Cassation) started to follow the CJEU's line on the GATT's legal status, thereby reversing earlier case law on the matter (O'Neill, 2005).…”

“…Among European countries, Switzerland traditionally follows and promotes a monistic doctrine for the application of WTO law, and has allows its direct applicability and enforceability in domestic courts (Petersmann, 1997;Karky, 2011). Similar practices have also been respected in Taiwan, where jurisprudence upheld the direct effect of WTO agreements in Taiwan's legal system and most case laws have tended to apply the laws directly (Liu, 2009).…”

Between law and politics: Explaining international dispute settlement behavior

“…Institutionalism also offers an explanation for the trend toward remarkably higher levels of judicialization of states' dispute settlement behavior under the GATT/WTO (Jackson, 1998;Petersmann, 1997;Zangl, 2006). As compared to GATT, the political (1) Rights of sanction are not regulated (EHR, CITES prior to reform) (2) Sanctions must be authorized, but disputing parties concerned can block them (GATT, UNSC) (3) Sanctions must be authorized, but dispute parties affected cannot block them (WTO, CITES after reform) (4) Sanctions can be mandated and disputing parties cannot block them Court procedure: extensive sanctioning authority independence of the dispute settlement procedures has been considerably strengthened under the WTO because dispute settlement panels made up of independent experts are supplemented with an independent court, the Appellate Body.…”