2018
DOI: 10.1177/0042098018794351
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The geopolitics of South–South infrastructure development: Chinese-financed energy projects in the global South

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Cited by 51 publications
(29 citation statements)
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“…For example, in their early formulation, Corbridge and Agnew (1991) mobilized 'geopolitical-economy' 3 to examine US budget and trade deficits (with respect to defence spending and US geopolitical ambitions in the context of the Cold War) through an analysis of the relational global positionality of the US economy, the role of the US in global politics, and their bearing on uneven geographical development within and outside the United States. In a similar vein, China's BRI can be seen as a complex combination of geopolitics and geoeconomics (Blanchard & Flint, 2017;Lee et al, 2018), both a response to slowing (domestic and global) economic growth in the form of export of excess industrial capacity (Harvey & Nak-Chung, 2017;Zhang, 2017) and as an attempt to secure geopolitical influence and resource markets (Mohan & Tan Mullins, 2018).…”
Section: Infrastructure Financing Geopolitical Economy and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 2 more Smart Citations
“…For example, in their early formulation, Corbridge and Agnew (1991) mobilized 'geopolitical-economy' 3 to examine US budget and trade deficits (with respect to defence spending and US geopolitical ambitions in the context of the Cold War) through an analysis of the relational global positionality of the US economy, the role of the US in global politics, and their bearing on uneven geographical development within and outside the United States. In a similar vein, China's BRI can be seen as a complex combination of geopolitics and geoeconomics (Blanchard & Flint, 2017;Lee et al, 2018), both a response to slowing (domestic and global) economic growth in the form of export of excess industrial capacity (Harvey & Nak-Chung, 2017;Zhang, 2017) and as an attempt to secure geopolitical influence and resource markets (Mohan & Tan Mullins, 2018).…”
Section: Infrastructure Financing Geopolitical Economy and Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Chinese state-owned 'policy banks', such as the China Development Bank (CDB) and China EXIM Bank are exporting a 'coordinated credit spaces' model, coordinating with Chinese state-owned commercial banks to reduce credit risks, and lending large amounts to portfolios of strategic projects (Chin & Gallagher, 2019). A backbone of the BRI, such financing enables SOEs to access and secure overseas markets for their goods and technology, as well as secure natural resources (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2018). Besides the use of SOEs, a main difference in China's approach is its lack of policy conditionality typically associated with Western development bank lending (Chin & Gallagher, 2019;Dunford, 2020; though there is still political pressure, see Mohan & Tan Mullins, 2018).…”
Section: Modalities Of Financing: Blurring Market-state Boundariesmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…The Chinese argue that such a system is able to deliver projects quickly which certainly seems to be true, and is one reason why this form of project funding and delivery is preferred by recipient leaders who often have an eye on political longevity. The World Bank was also negotiating for a loan to develop the gas infrastructure, but as Chen (2016: 2) notes in the context of the contract offered to Sinopec, it ‘provided the Ghanaians with an easy all‐inclusive deal that obviated the need to conduct laborious and independent stages of tendering and financing negotiations’ (see also Mohan and Tan‐Mullins, 2019).…”
Section: Chinese Oil Companies and Ghana's Developmentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Critical is, first, opening up the research frame to encompass key actors, especially the intermediaries – such as consultancies, law firms, treasury management advisors and professional associations – as ‘carriers of financialisation’ and market makers whose knowledge and expertise is mobilised and paid for in fees in the engagement and accommodation of commercial and municipal finance. This task will require extending beyond the cast of global North productions to those in the global South such as international aid and financial institutions (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2019) and logistics networks and universities (Kanai and Schindler, 2019), and exploring the intertwining of financial and non-governmental actors working inside the state (Farmer and Poulos, 2019). And, second, it requires deepening the inquiry critically to look beneath and behind the rhetoric and interrogate the substance of state and finance actors’ claims about ‘market demand’, ‘value’ and ‘worth’ in the infrastructure domain (Weber, 2020).…”
Section: What and Where Next?mentioning
confidence: 99%