In 2004 few could imagine Greece on the brink of state bankruptcy. Greece featured in the global news as the proudly successful host of the Olympic Games, it had successfully joined the Euro and was enjoying economic growth. This euphoria would end with the global financial crisis that followed the 2008 Lehman Brothers' collapse. When the private rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded Greek government bonds to junk status in 2010 the eurozone was ill-prepared to deal with it. Eurozone membership had given countries with high inflation records, like Greece, the opportunity to borrow at a favourable interest rate to fund their current account deficits. Eurozone members initially perceived Greece's troubles not as 'European' but as 'domestic' (Lefkofridi and Schmitter, 2015). The Greek crisis was diagnosed as being caused by domestic factors, such as low competitiveness, low revenues, high government spending and rent-seeking (Axt, 2010). Dismissing both the role played by governments and banks in countries other than Greece and the global context (Flassbeck, 2012; Krugman, 2012), discussions raged about lending to 'lazy' and 'corrupt' Greeks, who had been living 'beyond their means' (Endres, 2010; Jonker-Hoffrén, 2013). When market confidence in the bonds of other eurozone members (Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish) started declining as well, these countries were quick to reassure both markets and their eurozone partners that they were not 'another Greece' (Wachman, 2010). In this context, country differences were reduced to 'cultural characteristics and habits', as reflected in stereotypes of laziness, non-productivity, corruption, wasteful spending and lying (Van Vossole, 2016). A new acronym for a group of troubled countries-Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spainentered public discourse: 'PIIGS'. In the meantime, a huge market of credit default swaps had developed, in which speculators treated sovereign public debt as if it were equivalent to private corporate debt. In denial of their interdependence that necessitated solidarity, eurozone leaders opted to attribute blame to minimize electoral costs at home. By 2011, the eurozone had become deeply divided and the Eurothe second strongest currency in the worldfell hostage to the domestic politics of its member states. A potential Greek bankruptcy was dangerous for the European banks that held most of the Greek debt, which would then need to be bailed out with taxpayers' money. Given power asymmetries, however, non-indebted eurozone members had more space for * The authors would like to thank Yevhen Voronin for his invaluable help as research assistant at GESIS and the enriching feedback of the editors of the Annual Review.