The Gerrymanderers Are Coming! Legislative Redistricting Won't Affect Competition or Polarization Much, No Matter Who Does It

Abstract

Redistricting received substantial attention in the popular media in 2011, as states redrew state legislative and congressional district boundaries. Many reformers continue to argue for a de-politicization of the redistricting process, claiming that partisan redistricting is responsible for declining electoral competition and increasing legislative polarization. Our analysis of evidence from state legislatures during the last decade suggests that the effects of partisan redistricting on competition and polarization are small, considerably more nuanced than reformers would suggest, and overwhelmed by other aspects of the political environment.

The Effect of Redistricting Commissions on Electoral Competitiveness in U.S. House Elections, 2002-2010

“…Winburn's (2011) analysis of the "hypothetical single-year swing ratio" of the 2002 elections suggests that the results are the same regardless of who is responsible for the redistricting process. Similarly, Masket et al (2012) do not find evidence of clear long-term trends in levels of competition across the various redistricting methods.…”

“…) Similarly, Abramowitz et al (2006) argue that incresaed polarization of the electorate and incumbency advantage are more likely explanations for declining competitiveness in U.S. House elections. Masket et al's (2012) recent research shows very little difference in the levels of competitiveness in a commission-led process and the more traditional, legislature-led process. Winburn's (2011) analysis of the "hypothetical single-year swing ratio" of the 2002 elections suggests that the results are the same regardless of who is responsible for the redistricting process.…”

Polarization, Inequality, and the State Legislatures

“…Because of this, elected officials become more extreme in their positions causing more polarization in the legislative body. However intellectually elegant as this model is, the research finds that redistricting systems have a minimal if any effect on polarization and that any even modest effect may be at best short lived (Masket, Winburn, & Wright, 2012).…”

“…These are often considered acceptable because they fit nicely into a theoretical explanation that less competitive elections lead to more polarization in the legislature. Evidence demonstrates that in states where the redistricting process is controlled by a bipartisan commission, there is an increasing likelihood that there would be more competitive races, however, there does not appear to be any other differences between partisan legislative redistricting and more bipartisan systems (Masket, Winburn, & Wright, 2012). Other researchers note that polarization has been increasing across the nation regardless of the type of redistricting process.…”

Reforming California: Political Patchwork versus a Constitutional Convention

“…Political science literature is replete with scholarship showing how gerrymandered U.S. House districts have led to fewer competitive seats and increased party polarization within Congress (although other scholarship suggests that the role of gerrymandering in promoting these ills is overstated 3 ). This phenomenon also plays out at the state level, and this is particularly true in California, which has seen a dramatic polarization of political opin-ions between liberal Democrats along the coast and conservative Republicans inland.…”