The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

Machery, Édouard; Stich, Stephen; Rosé, David; Alai, Mario; Angelucci, Adriano; Berniūnas, Renatas; Buchtel, Emma Ellen Kathrina; Chatterjee, Amita; Cheon, Hyundeuk; Cho, In‐Rae; Cohnitz, Daniel; Cova, Florián; Dranseika, Vilius; Lagos, Ángeles Eraña; Ghadakpour, Laleh; Grinberg, Maurice; Hannikainen, Ivar R.; Hashimoto, Takaaki; Horowitz, Amir; Hristova, Evgenia; Jraissati, Yasmina; Kadreva, Veselina; Karasawa, Kaori; Kim, Hackjin; Kim, Yeonjeong; Lee, Min Woo; Mauro, Carlos; Mizumoto, Masaharu; Moruzzi, Sebastiano; Olivola, Christopher Y.; Ornelas, Jorge; Osimani, Barbara; Romero, Carlos Prado; Lopez, Alejandro Rosas; Sangoi, Massimo; Sereni, Andrea; Songhorian, Sarah; Sousa, Paulo; Struchiner, Noel; Tripodi, Vera; Usui, Naoki; Mercado, Alejandro Vázquez Del; Volpe, Giorgio; Vosgerichian, Hrag A.; Zhang, Xueyi; Zhu, Jing

doi:10.1007/s40961-017-0113-y

Cited by 65 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 43 publications

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“…The present findings thus deepen our appreciation for the cross‐cultural stability of core folk epistemological judgments pertaining to knowledge, truth, and evidence. As a result, the findings lend further support to the hypothesis that humans worldwide share a suite of species‐typical folk epistemological concepts (Kim & Yuan, unpublished data; Machery et al., , ; Rose et al., in press; Turri, ).…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 74%

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Turri

Park

2018

Cognitive Science

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Evidence from life science, cognitive science, and philosophy supports the hypothesis that knowledge is a central norm of the human practice of assertion. However, to date, the experimental evidence supporting this hypothesis is limited to American anglophones. If the hypothesis is correct, then such findings will not be limited to one language or culture. Instead, we should find a strong connection between knowledge and assertability across human languages and cultures. To begin testing this prediction, we conducted three experiments on Koreans in Korean. In each case, the findings replicated prior results observed in Americans and were corroborated by key findings from new replication studies on Americans using materials back-translated from Korean. These findings support the theory that there is a core, cross-culturally robust human practice of assertion and that, according to the rules of this practice, assertions should express knowledge.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 74%

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Turri

Park

2018

Cognitive Science

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“…Prior work suggests that people generally exhibit Gettier intuitions, possibly across different cultures and languages, for at least some Gettier type cases; indicating that people's conception of knowledge requires more than justification, truth, and belief (e.g., Machery et al, 2015Machery et al, , 2017Starmans and Friedman, 2012;. Although, past results have sometimes been mixed (e.g., Powell, Horne, Angel Pinillos, & Holyoak, 2015).…”

Section: The Moderating Role Of Luck On Epistemic Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Such inconsistencies are perhaps due to two major reasons: (1) people's epistemic intuitions lead them to make different judgements about the various types of Gettier type cases studied in the literature based on the particular way an accidentally true justified belief is characterized (e.g., "counterfeit object" cases, "evidence-replacement" cases, "authenticevidence" cases, "apparent-evidence" cases, etc.) and (2) variation in experimental designs, including differences in matched controls and some possibly underpowered samples (see Colaço et al, 2014;Machery et al, 2017;Powell, Horne, & Pinillos, 2013;Powell, Horne, Pinillos, & Holyoak, 2015;Starmans & Friedman, 2012;Turri et al, 2015;Weinberg et al, 2001). Our project focuses on obtaining a more precise estimate of the effect size of Gettier intuitions as they relate specifically to "counterfeit object" type Gettier cases.…”

Section: The Moderating Role Of Luck On Epistemic Intuitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…vs. "does the target know, or do they only think they know? "; e.g., Machery et al, 2017;. To check for these differences in knowledge attribution based on the form of the knowledge question, we will ask an exploratory binary knowledge attribution question after the visual analogue scales (see Appendix B).…”

Section: The Current Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Epistemic intuitions that prevent people from attributing knowledge to Gettier type protagonists, like Smith, have since been referred to as Gettier intuitions (DePaul & Ramsey, 1998;Machery et al, 2017;Sosa, 2007). Past research has revealed some evidence that people have a universal tendency to demonstrate Gettier intuitions for some Gettier-like scenarios (e.g., Machery et al, 2015;.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw (2015)

Hall¹,

Wagge²,

Chartier³

et al. 2018

Preprint

Self Cite

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According to the Justified True Belief (JTB) account of knowledge, a person’s ability to know something is defined by having a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is justified true belief). However, this account fails to consider the role of luck. In 1963, Gettier argued that JTB is insufficient because it does not account for certain situations, called Gettier cases, wherein a person is justified for believing something true but only because of luck. It is unclear whether lay people’s intuitions about knowledge lead them to agree with Gettier, such that lay people believe that individuals in these cases lack knowledge (referred to as Gettier intuitions). We attempt to provide a robust estimate of the Gettier intuition effect size by replicating Turri and colleagues’ (2015) Experiment 1. The Collaborative Replications and Education Project (CREP) selected this study for replication based on its undergraduate appeal, feasibility, and pedagogical value. However, in light of some inconsistent results, suboptimal designs, and inconsistent evidence for cultural variation (e.g., Machery et al., 2015; Nagel, et al., 2013; Seyedsayamdost et al., 2015; Starman & Friedman, 2012; Weinberg et al., 2001), the improved methodology of Turri et al. (2015) make it an important study to replicate cross-culturally. Therefore, we propose a multisite collaborative preregistered replication of Turri and colleague's (2015) Experiment 1 (35 labs from 14 countries across 4 continents signed up at time of submission; expected minimum N = 1,500). Results of this study are expected to provide a clearer picture of the Gettier intuition effect size, lay people’s theory and practice of knowledge, and potentially cross-cultural similarities and differences. Preprint: [X] Pre-registered protocols: [X]

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Sellars, Quine and Epistemic Naturalism

Sankey

2024

glob. Philosophy

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The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

Cited by 65 publications

References 43 publications

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw (2015)

Sellars, Quine and Epistemic Naturalism

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The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia

Cited by 65 publications

References 43 publications

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Knowledge and Assertion in Korean

Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri, Buckwalter, &amp; Blouw (2015)

Sellars, Quine and Epistemic Naturalism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About

Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw (2015)