One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of spatial attention. While the sceptic is correct that some putative cases are accurately deflected in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention might play in relevant contexts. This paper identifies alternative ways that selective attention might play a role in cognitive effects on perception. What emerges is a plausible and well-evidenced mental schema that describes attention-mediated cognitive penetration.
Keywords:Cognitive penetrability of perception, Top-down effects on perception, Attention, The cognition/perception distinction, Epistemology of perception, Modularity of mind Researchers in philosophy and cognitive science debate whether cognitive or "higher-level" states like belief, desire, and intention influence, in some important way, sensory experience: whether perception is cognitively penetrable. Does the very look of an object, say a painting, vary from perceiver to perceiver in a way that depends upon those perceivers' background beliefs, desires, values? This paper offers a new framing of an important point of the debate, how attention may or may not mediate cognition and perception in a way compatible with cognitive penetration. §1 offers brief clarification of the cognition/perception distinction and cognitive penetration. §2 identifies one common rejoinder to alleged cases of cognitive penetration, the "attention-shift interpretation", and identifies alternative ways that attention could mediate cognition and perception, and plausibly amount to cognitive penetration. The aim here is partly to shift the burden of proof to the sceptic of cognitive penetration, but also to make a case for attention-