The Governance of the European Union: The Potential for Multi‐Level Control

Abstract

In its White Paper on the Governance of the European Union the European Commission has adopted a narrow concept of governance which focuses almost exclusively on public institutions exercising legislative and executive power (in other words institutions of government). The article suggests that a theory of multi‐level control in the EU would attend to greater variety both in the available governance institutions and the techniques of control. The deployment of an analysis grounded in theories of control suggests that the European Commission is substantially holding to a long‐held preference for instruments of government premised on the exercise of hierarchical power. This reform path sits uneasily with revived concerns to render the governance of the EU more democratic. Equally it inhibits the generation of more efficient governance arrangements which place greater dependence on communities, competition, and design as alternative bases of control to hierarchy. Control theory suggests that the assertion of different reform agendas and institutional structures by other actors can check the more wayward (and arguably illegitimate) tendencies within the Commission plan, whilst drawing in alternative bases of control which, when combined, may yield technically superior governance solutions.

Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A Network Approach

“…The implication, accepted in this paper, is that accountability is primarily retrospective. We recognise both that the term may be more generously interpreted so as to encompass prior participation in the policy-making process, and also that an ancillary standard-setting function may be comprised (Scott 2002). However, we reject the idea that either provides an adequate substitute for ex post facto political and legal accountability; indeed, participation may tend to undercut accountability by internalising a process that we see as inherently external.…”

“…This article focuses on ex post facto accountability. We recognise that accountability may encompass prior participation in policy making, comprising also a standard-setting function, 14 but emphatically reject the idea that these can provide an adequate substitute for ex post facto political and legal accountability. In addition to the danger that participants in policy making may be sucked into the network and rendered complicit in decisions, Bignami highlights the weakness of EU rule-making procedures, contrasting them unfavourably with the robust protections of American administrative law.…”

Multilevel governance and problem‐solving: Towards a dynamic theory of multilevel policy‐making?

“…In a nutshell, MLG is a concept applied to make sense of the interaction between a multiplicity of actors across different levels of government, which can occur either within a general purpose, territorially bounded polity (Type I) or according to a task‐specific logic where jurisdictions are overlapping and potentially unlimited in number and scope (Type II) (Hooghe and Marks , p. 236). This concept originated from the study of the European Union and in particular from the observation that policy‐making in the EU entails not only the continuous negotiation between various levels of government (national, regional, local) (Marks ), but also the fragmentation of political authority and the corresponding empowerment of more informal entities or arm's‐length bodies such as policy networks, comitology committees and independent agencies, as well as of non‐state actors (Scharpf ; Scott ). This concept was then generalized following parallel developments in other areas, such as the growing importance of transnational networks, global regulators, and civil society initiatives beyond the nation state (Rosenau and Czempiel ; Slaughter ).…”

Migration Control and Narratives of Steering

“…Second, it is acknowledged that these social systems have become increasingly complex, rendering traditional control instruments ineffective (Moran 2002). The state continues to rely on ‘command strategies’ of law (Stewart 1988), or traditional forms of regulations backed up by hierarchical enforcement of sanctions (Scott 2002). These instruments are systematically failing to motivate compliance or achieve the desired outcomes.…”