The Government and Politics of Lebanon

Salamey, Imad

doi:10.4324/9780203746424

Cited by 29 publications

(38 citation statements)

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“…Of the 30 ministers, 16 came from the 14 March Alliance and 11 from the 8 March Alliance, thereby giving the opposition the one-third of cabinet seats necessary to invoke the veto powers established in the constitution. 44 This episode shows the increased importance of cabinet composition after the constitutionalization of the mutual veto in the form of a specified minority of government ministers. Salamey sees the Doha agreement as weakening parliament, limiting majoritarian rule, and overall deepening consociationalism.…”

Section: Formal and Informal Consociationalism In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Salamey sees the Doha agreement as weakening parliament, limiting majoritarian rule, and overall deepening consociationalism. 45 In Table 1, there is a question mark in the bottom right cell, indicating uncertainty about the status of the mutual veto as an informal institution. Lijphart has little doubt, writing about the mutual veto as a "basic, but again unwritten, provision of the political system."…”

Section: Formal and Informal Consociationalism In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon

Bogaards

2019

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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In the past decades, New Institutionalism in political science has rekindled an interest in the role of institutions and has theorized the interaction between formal and informal institutions. Unfortunately, little of this has made its way into the consociational literature. This article brings together the two bodies of work, focusing on the case of Lebanon because it allows for a unique analysis over time of the different ways in which consociational features have been institutionalized. The National Pact of 1943 was a gentleman's agreement between the political leaders of the two main religious communities. It formed the basis of a consociational system that lasted for decades. After the civil war, the Taif Agreement reintroduced consociationalism, but this time more institutions were constitutionalized. However, it would be mistaken to view this as a simple contrast between informal (pre-civil war) versus formal (post-civil war) consociationalism, because even today the most important consociational institution is informal. This article traces the development and interaction of informal and formal consociational institutions in Lebanon. In doing so, it contributes not only to the consociational literature and the debate about the merits of liberal versus corporate consociations, but also to New Institutionalism and questions about the relative strength of formal versus informal institutions.

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Section: Formal and Informal Consociationalism In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Formal and Informal Consociationalism In Lebanonmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon

Bogaards

2019

Nationalism and Ethnic Politics

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“…"Subsequently, Lebanon emerged as sectarian as ever and sectarian consociationalism was entrenching deeper within the country's political fabric" (Salamey, 2014). Amidst all these given facts, the Doha agreement stood for merely three years, as the perpetual enriched sectarian power struggle magnified in a region where uprisings commenced to take the nations by storm.…”

Section: Lebanese Sectarian Consociationalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clientelism has safeguarded the sectarian power-sharing scheme, in the sense that every sectarian leader is obliged to match his colleagues in providing access to the public resources. "It is within this context that sectarian populist political movements in Lebanon, under the patronage of charismatic leaderships, became the dominant vehicle for advancing groups' interests" (Salamey, 2014).…”

Section: Welfare Network?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The persistence of clientelism in Lebanon. (c2015)

Geadah¹

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“…The Sunni community, unlike other sectarian communities in Lebanon, has been witnessing a political transition at the representation level, not only the leadership. Because the Lebanese political system is a democratic umbrella that gathers sectarian factions which transferred the feudal organization around a zaim or lord, it is the political/sectarian leaders that are perceived as responsible for the welfare of their communities (Salamey, 2014). Technically, in the by the membership in the party and the lack of resources.…”

Section: Roots For Radicalization and Catalysts For Sectarian Conflictmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sectarian conflict and sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon. (c2015)

Luca¹

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Dedication To my husband, Joe, and my son, Gaby vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This project would not have been possible without the incredible support of my advisor, Dr. Makram Ouaiss, who guided me through the research, encouraged me and carefully read every word of this thesis. Also, many thanks to my committee members: Dr. Marwan Rowayheb, who constantly motivated and guided me, and Dr. Sami Baroudi, who shared with me his expertise. And finally, special thanks to my friends Nadine Elali, who guided me through the complex political scene in Tripoli, and Myra Abdallah, who helped with translation. And last, but not least, to my colleagues at NOW English.

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The Government and Politics of Lebanon

Cited by 29 publications

References 0 publications

Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon

Formal and Informal Consociational Institutions: A Comparison of the National Pact and the Taif Agreement in Lebanon

The persistence of clientelism in Lebanon. (c2015)

Sectarian conflict and sunni Islamic radicalization in Tripoli, Lebanon. (c2015)

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