The Government's Choice of Bureaucratic Organisation: An Application to Italian State Museums

Fedeli, Silvia; Santoni, Michele

doi:10.1007/s10824-006-9005-8

Cited by 21 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…The first line looks at the museum as an institution that has a private and a social role: it has to satisfy the present visitors but it has to improve and preserve the present collection for future generations (Johnson, 2003). The main issues within this research line concern the organizational form (e.g., Fedeli and Santoni, 2006), the managerial aspects of supplying services and merchandise, along with the strategies for reducing production costs and fund raising (Kotler and Kotler, 1998). A large number of empirical studies are devoted to estimating visitors' willingness to pay and their price elasticity, with the final scope of evaluating the effect of the introduction of admission fees, as a new source of revenue (Santagata and Signorello, 2000;Maddison and Foster, 2003;Lampi and Orth, 2009).…”

Section: Tourism Flows and Attendance At Museums And Monumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Also in this case, more articulated data are available, but generally we limit ourselves to the aggregate datum (MUSMONUV). Note that only cultural sites run by the State are considered here: though questionable, this is a necessary choice, due to the fact that consistent data are not completely available for monuments or museums run by private subjects or local public administrations; however, the main cultural sites are run by the State in Italy, and these museums account for over one third of the visits to museums (as documented, e.g., by Fedeli and Santoni, 2006), so we believe that our data are sufficiently representative.…”

Section: The Italian Casementioning

confidence: 99%

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Museum and monument attendance and tourism flow: a time series analysis approach

Cellini

Cuccia

2013

Applied Economics

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-This paper takes a time series analysis approach to evaluate the directions of causality between tourism flows, on the one side, and museum and monument attendance, on the other. We consider Italy as a case study, and analyze monthly data over the period January 1996 to December 2007. All considered series are seasonally integrated, and co-integration links emerge. We focus on the error correction mechanism among co-integrated time series to detect the directional link(s) of causality. Clear-cut results emerge: generally, the causality runs from tourist flows to museum and monument attendance. The non-stationary nature of time series, their cointegration relationships, and the direction of causal links suggest specific implication for tourism and cultural policies.Keywords: Tourism, Museum, Seasonal unit root, Co-integration, Causality. Roberto Cellini - MUSEUM & MONUMENT ATTENDANCE AND TOURISM FLOW: A Time Series Analysis ApproachAbstract: This paper takes a time series analysis approach to evaluate the directions of causality between tourism flows, on the one side, and museum and monument attendance, on the other. We consider Italy as a case study, and analyze monthly data over the period January 1996 to December 2007. All considered series are seasonally integrated, and co-integration links emerge. We focus on the error correction mechanism among co-integrated time series to detect the directional link(s) of causality. Clear-cut results emerge: generally, the causality runs from tourist flows to museum and monument attendance. The non-stationary nature of time series, their cointegration relationships, and the direction of causal links suggest specific implication for tourism and cultural policies.

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Section: Tourism Flows and Attendance At Museums And Monumentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Italian Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Museum and monument attendance and tourism flow: a time series analysis approach

Cellini

Cuccia

2013

Applied Economics

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“…Moreover, the introduction of control agents whose aim is to safeguard public funds would reduce the diversion of public funds for discretionary purposes, unless such agents pursue interests of their own, so that the increased number of players results in an increased number of resources' claimants instead of increased benefits to the electorate [6].The starting point of this paper is different because (i) what it is observed in reality is substantially different from the 1 government-1 bureau relationships depicted by the standard literature. Seeking examples fitting to the original Niskanean-type bureaucracy, we can barely find spatial activities of NASA in the U.S. and conclude that it is almost always the case that the government deals with more than one bureau for the public supply of goods and services or that a common bureau supplies more than one good to different levels of government as in [7]. There are only few exceptions in the literature considering competing bureaucracies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…The starting point of this paper is different because (i) what it is observed in reality is substantially different from the 1 government-1 bureau relationships depicted by the standard literature. Seeking examples fitting to the original Niskanean-type bureaucracy, we can barely find spatial activities of NASA in the U.S. and conclude that it is almost always the case that the government deals with more than one bureau for the public supply of goods and services or that a common bureau supplies more than one good to different levels of government as in [7]. There are only few exceptions in the literature considering competing bureaucracies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?

2019

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Governments often support their preferences for decentralised (centralised) bureaucracies on the grounds of efficiency considerations (production side). Here, we consider the demand side, i.e., whether the government perception of citizens’ demand for differentiated goods/services might increase efficiency by simply reshuffling bureaucratic production activities. We represent the budgetary process—between an incumbent governing party and n-competing bureaus producing differentiated goods/services—as a simultaneous Nash-compliance game with complete information. On these grounds, we analyse—in terms of public production, players’ rents and payoffs—the effects of increasing competition (as for the number of bureaus) in the political–bureaucratic market. Moreover, we evaluate, ceteris paribus, the effects of bureaucratic reshuffling from the point of view of society, assumed to prefer those policies that approximate social efficiency by minimising bureaucratic and political rents.

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“…In this paper, we propose an additional determinant of a government's decision to consolidate public bureaus, which is driven by strategic incentives to reduce bureaucratic slack. We model the interaction between the government and the bureaus as a two-stage game (see also Fedeli and Santoni 2006). In the first stage, the government chooses whether to consolidate or to keep two bureaus separate.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS

2018

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We propose a model where a regional government's choice of the number of bureaucratic agencies operating in a region depends upon the degree of substitutability and complementarity of the bureaucratic services being demanded. We show that, if the government perceives the citizens' demand as a demand for substitutable services, it will choose provision by two independent agencies. If the government perceives the citizens' demand as a demand for complementary services, it will choose provision by a single consolidated agency. Exogenous shocks to the number of citizens amplify these incentives. Evidence from the Italian National Health Service (NHS) supports this hypothesis. Results show a positive effect of proxies of substitutable services on the number of regional local health authorities and a negative effect of proxies of complementary services. The major immigration amnesties, taken as shocks to the number of citizens entitled to the service, magnify these effects.Keywords Bureaucratic institutional design · Public local health authorities · Consolidation and decentralization of local health authorities · Italian NHS JEL Classification D73 · H75 · I18 · L32 Would you say it is normal to have regions with 7 provinces and 22 Local Health Authorities? […] In my opinion, the idea of regions with 7 provinces and 22LHAs is an aberration. So if in agreement with the regions, since this task falls within their responsibilities, we can at last cut the number of managerial positions in the LHAs and apply 'standard costs' throughout, so that the proverbial needle has to cost the same in Calabria as in Lombardy, I would say this is a good thing. (Matteo Renzi, Italian PM, 10th April 2015, http://www.gover no.it/ media /consi glio-dei-minis tri-n58/619, 5:25-6:20; our translation)

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The Government's Choice of Bureaucratic Organisation: An Application to Italian State Museums

Abstract: bureaucracy, state museums, Italy,

Cited by 21 publications

References 18 publications

Museum and monument attendance and tourism flow: a time series analysis approach

Museum and monument attendance and tourism flow: a time series analysis approach

Bureaucratic Reshuffling and Efficiency: Do n-Competing Bureaus Determine Inefficient Results?

Bureaucratic institutional design: the case of the Italian NHS

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