The grammar of institutions: The challenge of distinguishing between strategies, norms, and rules

Schlüter, Achim; Theesfeld, Insa

doi:10.1177/1043463110377299

Cited by 48 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 59 publications

(66 reference statements)

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“…These are institutions that find their place so long as common understandings, values, traditions or practices (after McGinnis 2011; Oyserman and Uskul 2014) exist among users, and become sufficiently valued within the on-trail environment to allow for conformance through processes of "internal enforcement" (Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). This finding breaks down the conceptual divide between 'institutions' and 'culture', which rather than standing distinct begin to shade into one another (Hall and Taylor 1996).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…On TI, our findings on rules and norms (as "codes of conduct") show that the site's institutional arrangements are private in their source and decentralized in their making (after Ingram and Clay 2000), born of societal conventions and ontrail interactions, and taking the form of informal strategies and norms rather than formal rules (Crawford and Ostrom 1995;Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). These institutions, which evolve internal to an individual or are acquired in the context of the community in which that individual interacts (Ostrom 2014), function as the unwritten and largely unspoken set of obligations and rights that bind TI's trail users.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, the case provides an opportunity to investigate how members of a commons based on informal social institutions deal with issues of authority, obligation, and enforcement (Diermeier and Krehbiel 2003;Streeck and Thelen 2005;Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010), and adapt to changing contextual factors over time (McGinnis 2011). As the number of users grows, the relations of interdependence between users and the institutions they respond to will also increase, potentially creating problems of overload and an impetus for institutional change.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A study of institutional origins and change in a Canadian urban commons

Robson¹,

Sinclair²,

Diduck³

2015

Int J Commons

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Kenora is a small city located in northwestern Ontario, Canada. The study presented here focuses on Tunnel Island, 300 acres of forested land adjacent to Kenora's downtown. The island is used and valued by both city residents and members of three nearby Ojibway nations. As a multipleuse, common-pool resource accessed by different groups for a range of nonextractive activities, the site has become an experiment in multicultural commons governance, and presents an excellent opportunity to examine the origins and development of institutions for managing collective environmental resources in an urban setting. Using participant observation, internet-and field-based user surveys, and semi-structured interviews, our research finds that grassroots 'governance' of the site is emerging through subtle processes of individual and social construction, with the strategies and norms (codes of conduct) employed by users providing relative harmony on the trails, which suggests functioning commons institutions. Nevertheless, values-based and epistemic tensions exist among users, pointing to governance challenges for planned joint management of the site, and specifically the need to develop formal, legitimate, and yet flexible and inclusive arrangements that can operate in conjunction with the social practice of existing users.A study of institutional origins and change in a Canadian urban commons 699

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A study of institutional origins and change in a Canadian urban commons

Robson¹,

Sinclair²,

Diduck³

2015

Int J Commons

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“…Our cases reveal a high share of informal rules, where the sanctions are not outlined in written form, or a Ostrom (2005, p. 33) punishment for breaking the rules is not set up clearly. Particularly, the distinction between informal community-level rules and norms is empirically difficult to specify (Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010). To cope with that, we follow Ostrom (2014), comprising both (rules and norms) as rules-in-use.…”

Section: The Iad Framework: a Rules Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effects of rules on local political decision-making processes: How can rules facilitate participation?

2017

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It is often claimed that participation empowers local actors and that an inclusive decision-making process is crucial for rural development. We aim to investigate how formal and informal rules are set in local decision-making processes and how those rules may impact the actual level of participation by local actors. In a comparative case study, the rules-in-use for the planning of community projects in Thailand are examined. For our analysis, we use the Institutional Analysis and Development framework, which allows for more precise analysis of the impact of the rules. Fifty-three villages are served by four selected Tambon Administrative Organisations (TAO) which are either known for success in achieving participation or ranked as problematic in implementing the decentralization and local participation goals of the Thai government. The study is based on 60 semistructured interviews with TAO staff, a survey of village leaders in 50 villages and a household survey of 104 villagers. We scrutinize seven types of rules and show some particular differences in terms of the impact from the rules-in-use. In the TAOs ranked as less participatory, the attendance rate in the meetings is found to be lower (boundary rule), villagers are informed about a meeting with a shorter notice (information rule) and more villagers mention that elites interfere in the project selection process (aggregation rule). A high level of fuzziness appeared in the position and authority rules. Further, we obtained information on the particular deontic logic, showing generally a high share of de facto may-statements in the implementation of the rules. We conclude that if the policy goal is enhancing participation, rule-setting offers good scope for intervention. From a practical perspective, information on administrative procedures has to be made more accessible and public administrators should receive procedural training.

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“…In a third step, we conducted structured interviews with three monitors and the president of the cooperative to identify changes in the rules and property rights system (GS4-GS8) devised by the cooperative and corporations for the governance of the alps. Furthermore, the statutes of the cooperative named Taleinung from the years 1867, 1923, and 2002, and the statutes of the corporation "Scheidegg" from 1913 and 2003 were coded for changes in rules following the grammar for analyzing institutional statements (ADICO) (Crawford and Ostrom 1995, Basurto et al 2009, Schlüter and Theesfeld 2010. The corporation Scheidegg was chosen as an example because of its excellent data availability.…”

Section: Data Collection and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%