We adopt a stepwise approach to the analysis of a dynamic oligopoly game in which production makes use of a natural resource and pollutes the environment, starting with simple models where …rms'output is not a function of the natural resource to end up with a full- ‡edged model in which (i) the resource is explicitly considered as an input of production and (ii) the natural resource and pollution interact via the respective state equations. This allows us to show that the relationship between the welfare properties of the economic system and the intensity of competition is sensitive to the degree of accuracy with which the model is constructed.JEL codes: C73, H23, L13, O31, Q2, Q3 Keywords: environmental externality, resource extraction, oligopoly, Pigouvian taxation, R&D We would like to thank Roberto Cellini and Arsen Palestini for useful comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.