The Great Powers and Regional Conflicts: Eastern Europe and the Balkans from the Post-Napoleonic Era to the Post-Cold War Era

Abstract

The objective of this article is to provide an analytical framework for addressing the sources of great power regional involvement and its effects on regional conflicts. The thesis of the article is that variations in the degree of intensity of conflicts and the likelihood of successful conflict resolution in different regions are affected by the character of great power involvement in these regions. Our argument is that although great power involvement or noninvolvement cannot cause or terminate regional conflicts, it can either intensify existing local conflicts or mitigate them. We will propose causal linkages between balances of great power capabilities and interests, types of great power involvement in regional conflicts, and patterns of regional conflicts. The study will distinguish among four types of great power involvement in regional conflicts: competition, cooperation, dominance, and disengagement. The empirical section will examine the application of these propositions in seven historical illustrations, representing the four patterns of great power involvement in regional conflicts. All the illustrations will deal with one conflict‐ridden region‐Eastern Europe and the Balkans, in successive historical periods from the post‐Napoleonic era to the post‐Cold War era. Because of the variety of patterns of great power involvement in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, this region is uniquely suited to examine the propositions derived from the theoretical framework. Drawing on both the theoretical deductions and the historical illustrations should make it possible in the last section to discuss briefly the implications of the proposed framework for regional conflict management or mitigation in the Balkans in the post‐Cold War era.

Rethinking the Future of Europe

“…Moreover, unlike Georgia, Russia was a party to the Permanent Joint Council with the NATO. In specific crises, like in former Yugoslavia, when the United Nations declared a no-fly zone over Bosnia and the arms embargo was imposed, the Yeltsin government did exert pressure on Belgrade to stop the bloodshed in Sarajevo in 1994 (Miller and Kagan, 1997). On the political wagon of this process, it should be recalled that the normative foundations for the Tbilisi-Brussels relationship were laid in 1996, when negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) kicked off, to be concluded in 1999, delineating cooperation in five policy areas: trade, investment and economic, legislative and cultural activities.…”

When and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace1

“…The great power strategy can lead to regional peace, but only if the great power involvement is one of a great power concert or hegemony by one of the great powers (see Miller and Kagan 1997). There are important differences between these two types of involvement; however, they are broadly similar in their effects on regional peace.…”

“…(1) Restrain aggressive local clients intent on wars of expansion by imposing diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions. In a situation of great power competition for regional influence, a regional state may be offered support by one of the competing great powers; under a concert or hegemony, however, small states do not have such an option (Miller and Kagan 1997). The great powers need not worry about losing clients to their rivals; the client states have less maneuvering room and cannot escape the great power's restraining pressure.…”

“…Changes in the global balance of power, for example, may weaken the hegemon, allowing competing powers to support local revisionist states. A concert might disintegrate into great power rivalry (Mearsheimer 1995;Kagan 1997Kagan -1998. In the absence of hegemonic leadership, the great powers may act as free riders and disengage from regional peacemaking efforts (Miller and Kagan 1997).…”

Perspectives on Structural Realism

“…9. On the differences between aggressive and defensive realism and for citations, see Snyder (1991, 11-12), Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1995), Frankel (1996a,b), and Miller (1996). Although there are strong connections between neorealism and defensive realism on the one hand and between classical and aggressive realism on the other, some recent neorealist works follow the tradition of classical/aggressive realism with regard to the core assumption of power maximization rather than of security preservation.…”