2021
DOI: 10.1080/23302674.2021.1983884
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The green supply chains’ ordering and pricing competition under carbon emissions regulations of the government

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Cited by 8 publications
(6 citation statements)
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References 65 publications
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“…Long (2021) proposed a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises, and consumers based on green sensitivity [33]. K. Halat (2023) considered the competition problem among green supply chains and proposed to construct a game study between a government agency and two competing green supply chains [34]. C. Mondal (2022) [35] proposed a study of a two-level green closed-loop supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and a common retailer with government intervention, which is used to discuss the optimal firm decision of the manufacturer [33].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Long (2021) proposed a three-party evolutionary game model of the government, enterprises, and consumers based on green sensitivity [33]. K. Halat (2023) considered the competition problem among green supply chains and proposed to construct a game study between a government agency and two competing green supply chains [34]. C. Mondal (2022) [35] proposed a study of a two-level green closed-loop supply chain composed of two competing manufacturers and a common retailer with government intervention, which is used to discuss the optimal firm decision of the manufacturer [33].…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For SC analysis, we cannot ignore the IR or reservation profit level of individual agents. In most of the times, this reservation profit level decides the possibility of trade among the agents (Halat et al, 2021). Ramani et al (2021) analyze two-echelon SC coordination with the help of revenue-sharing and LTT contract by considering the IRs of both the agent in SC.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rahimi et al (2021) investigates the market competition between a green and a non-green SC under fuzzy demand by incorporating the IR constraint in the game-theoretic modeling. Halat et al (2021) analyze the ordering and pricing competition for carbon emissions sensitive uncertain SC by considering IR constraint in fuzzy Stackelberg game. It is important to note here that none of the abovementioned studies consider the cut-off policy and contract sequence in their models.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Kebijakan penetapan harga karbon dapat dilakukan salah satunya dengan mengenakan pajak karbon. Menurut Halat et al (2021) dalam skema pajak karbon, perusahaan dikenakan sanksi karena menghasilkan emisi dengan membayar pajak.…”
Section: Pendahuluanunclassified