The growth of the public sector in Switzerland

Lane, Jan‐Erik; Mæland, Reinert

doi:10.1080/01402380108425438

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Explaining the growth in the public sector has been one of the central research areas within political science (Peacock and Wiseman 1961;Tarschys 1975;Taylor 1983;Lybeck 1986;Peters 2001). Theories are multiple, ranging from macro explanations that focus on the relationship between general growth in a nation's GDP and relative growth in the public sector (Lane and Maeland 2001) or the 'relative price effect' of the labour intensive public sector (Baumol 1967), to micro oriented explanations that focus on characteristics of the budgeting process itself (Wildavsky 1964;Wagner 1991), the election cycle (Frey 1978) or the existence of 'negotiated economies' (Wilson 1989).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians’ and Administrators’ Spending Preferences

Jacobsen

2006

Public Administration

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The notion that appointed bureaucrats act as budget maximizers still stands strong within theories attempting to explain the growth in the size of the public sector. This paper reports the results of a case study that included local authority politicians and bureaucrats in 30 Norwegian municipalities and where differences in spending preferences was empirically investigated. Counter to the original theory, bureaucrats seem to be less expansive than their political counterparts. The most expansive were found to be members of political left-wing parties, the more peripheral politicians and administrators, women, those with lower education and those working in the public sector. Nevertheless, there is some support given to a modified hypothesis that administrators have stronger preferences for 'slack' (that is, organizational slack in terms of spending more money on internal administration) than politicians. The data also strongly support the notion that within a specialized sector, both politicians and administrators have similar preferences for higher spending to their specific sector.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians’ and Administrators’ Spending Preferences

Jacobsen

2006

Public Administration

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“…Armingeon 2005;Lane and Maeland 2001; Obinger et al 2010 26 One worry could be that there is measurement error in the way that people answer these survey questions. As emphasized by Prior 2010, a respondent's measured attitude may fluctuate from period to period simply because their true attitude lies somewhere between "neutral" and "support."…”

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confidence: 99%

How do Economic Circumstances Determine Preferences? Evidence from Long-run Panel Data

O’Grady¹

2017

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Preferences for redistribution and social spending are correlated with income and unemployment risk, but it is unclear how these relationships come about. I build a theory emphasizing that only large changes in economic circumstances provide the information and motivation needed for people to change their preferences. Stable long-run preferences are shaped mainly by early socialization, which includes economic and ideological influences from the family, and early labor market experiences. Enduring shocks, low intergenerational mobility and the tendency of left-wing parents to be poorer generate correlations between circumstances and preferences. Because preferences are stable, greater inequality may not increase aggregate support for redistribution. Support is found for the theory with panel data from Switzerland, using a range of empirical tests.

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Direkte Demokratie in der Schweiz und die Wirkung auf die Staatstätigkeit

Wagschal¹

2023

dms

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Der Beitrag untersucht Policy-Wirkungen der direkten Demokratie. Dabei werden sämtliche bisherige Volksabstimmungen, das heißt obligatorische und fakultative Referenden sowie Volksinitiativen, in der Schweiz analysiert. Die Frage, ob Direktdemokratie expansiv oder restriktiv auf die Staatstätigkeit wirkt, ist dabei die erste Forschungsfrage. Dabei stehen die Sozialpolitik und die Öffentlichen Finanzen im Mittelpunkt der Analyse. Zudem wird dann nach den Effekten für die einzelnen Instrumente differenziert. Darüber hinaus werden die Abstimmungsparolen des Bundesrates, des Parlaments sowie der Parteien und Verbände untersucht. Im Ergebnis zeigt der Beitrag einen bremsenden Effekt über alle Schweizer Abstimmungen hinweg. Diese Wirkungen sind nach den einzelnen Instrumenten unterschiedlich, insbesondere das fakultative Referendum entfaltet eine Bremswirkung. Die geringe Zahl expansiver Volksinitiativen verweist darauf, dass der „Gaspedal“-Effekt der Volksinitiative eher gering und indirekter Natur ist. Eine besonders hohe Erfolgsquote mit ihren Abstimmungsparolen weisen die Parteien der politischen Mitte auf. Die Parteien an den politischen Rändern sind dagegen eher deutlich geringer erfolgreich.

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The growth of the public sector in Switzerland

Cited by 3 publications

References 8 publications

Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians’ and Administrators’ Spending Preferences

Public Sector Growth: Comparing Politicians’ and Administrators’ Spending Preferences

How do Economic Circumstances Determine Preferences? Evidence from Long-run Panel Data

Direkte Demokratie in der Schweiz und die Wirkung auf die Staatstätigkeit

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