The Habits of Normal, Innocent People, as Construed by the North American Juror

Abstract

Deliberating juries draw on commonsense notions of what counts as "normal" behavior in distinguishing facts which are inculpatory from those that lend themselves to more innocent interpretation. Though this is a commonplace observation, prior research has shed little light on the underlying model(s) of normalcy. Taking a generative approach to inculpatory statements made by two real-life juries deliberating the same case, I first enumerate the distinct assertions made, by implication, about normal, innocent people (NIPs), and then reduce these to a smaller number of rules revolving around the general themes of rationality, emotions, language, and relationships.

Storytelling Rituals in Jury Deliberations

“…However, there are two reasons to be relatively confident about these claims. The first is that, as will be discussed below, the findings are consistent with in-depth research on real jury deliberations, as reported by Maynard and Manzo (1993), Conley and Conley (2009) and Gibson (2016). Second, while it may seem reasonable to hypothesize that these factors would limit effective ritual and emotional exchange, this was not the case.…”

“…A few notable scholars have used video and audio recordings of juries to investigate the dynamics of deliberation (Maynard and Manzo 1993, Manzo 1993, 1994, 1996, Conley and Conley 2009, Gibson 2016. One reason this literature is so small may be the lack of data available on real deliberating juries, due to legal protections.…”

“…For instance, Gibson (2016) demonstrates ways jurors employ taxonomic notions of how a "normal, innocent person" should act. Such notions draw on typifications or a shared knowledge of the characteristics people have and roles they play in a society (Schutz 1967).…”

“…Such "normative assertions" (Manzo 1994) carry implicit shared assumptions about the priorities and needs of unemployed people and mothers, and the dynamics of friendship. Underlying such taxonomic distinctions are generative rules of normalcy, or abstracted assumptions about reasons for action, rules for the expression of emotions, and rules guiding interactions within relationships (Gibson 2016; see also Polletta and Lee 2006 for an analysis of reasons and their underlying principles).…”

The Moral Limits of Predictive Practices: The Case of Credit-Based Insurance Scores

“…To organize my thoughts, I took notes and wrote memos (Charmaz 2012;Glaser and Strauss 2007). These memos, a key aspect of my analytic approach, summarized arguments, developed emergent themes, and abstracted away from explicit statements to excavate the underlying principles animating the debate (Gibson 2016;Lofland et al 2006;Miles and Huberman 1994). My approach can be described as abductive (Tavory and Timmermans 2014).…”