The Hanford Advisory Board: participatory democracy, technology, and representation

Abstract

The Hanford Advisory Board (HAB) is a broadly representative, deliberative body that provides formal policy advice on Department of Energy (DOE) proposals and decisions at the Hanford nuclear cleanup site near Richland, Washington. Despite considerable skepticism about the effectiveness of citizen advisory boards, we contend that the HAB offers promising institutional innovations. Drawing on our analysis of the HAB's formal advice as well as our interviews with board members and agency officials, we explore the HAB's unique design, outline a normative framework for evaluating participatory institutions, and assess the HAB's effectiveness in rendering the DOE accountable to the local public.Keywords Bureaucracy . Deliberative democracy . Hanford Advisory Board . Participatory democracy . Technology Highly technical policy decisions present daunting challenges for democracy, for two reasons. First, their sheer complexity makes them difficult for even informed citizens to understand; second, these decisions are often entrusted to bureaucracies whose officials are not directly accountable to citizens and whose deliberations are often hidden from public view. In order to render government accountable to the public, citizens must be able to see how policy decisions stand to affect their interests and to understand-broadly speaking-the range of available policy alternatives. When they are unable to do so, for either of the two reasons just cited, they find themselves exposed to the discretionary power of bureaucrats, scientists, or policy experts. One of the major tasks of empirically informed democratic theory is to analyze and evaluate practices and institutions that use public participation to try to render highly technical public decision-making more transparent and accountable to the public, and therefore more legitimate (Fischer 2009;Dietz and Stern 2008;Fung and Wright 2003;Kleinman 2000;Dryzek 2010;Fishkin 2011). This paper investigates one such institution: the Hanford Advisory Board (HAB), a broadly representative, deliberative body that provides formal, policy advice on Department of Energy (DOE) proposals and decisions at the Hanford nuclear cleanup site near Richland, Washington. Critics have expressed considerable skepticism about citizen advisory boards as instruments of democratic accountability; they have criticized their lack of independence, their lack of formal power, and their failure to adequately represent affected groups (Laurian 2007; Arnstein 1969;Vari 1995;Lynn and Kartez 1995;Santos and Chess 2003). We use these concerns to frame our central research questions: Does the HAB provide effective democratic oversight and accountability at the Hanford nuclear cleanup site? If so, what specific features of the HAB enable it to serve these democratic purposes? And, more broadly, what lessons can its successes (and limitations) teach us about rendering technical, bureaucratic decisionmaking more accountable to the public?We argue that the HAB serves important democratic functions at Hanford....

Missed Connections

“…With a few notable exceptions, the CAC research reviewed here is generally case study based, with sample sizes of five or fewer. Additionally, few of the CAC studies published since the 1980s shed light on CACs impact on implementation because the authors focus on a variety of other values of public engagement in planning such as incorporating the public’s concerns into policy debates (Sager and Zakara 2014), idealized speech conditions (Santos and Chess 2003), and CAC control of policy decisions (Hannah and Lewis 1982). Finally, when CAC studies discuss outcomes of the planning process, the majority consider only the plan or planning policy adopted immediately following the planning process.…”

“…Additionally, some of these cases may have geographically specific findings. For example, a cluster of studies investigates CAC roles in planning for the remediation of contaminated federal property, in planning processes managed by federal agencies (Laurian 2005, 2007; Sager and Zakara 2014; Santos and Chess 2003). Other studies focus on topics ranging from a CAC’s impact on urban design in Boston, MA (Crewe 2001), to the role of a CAC in the larger process of land conservation planning in Phoenix, AZ (Ewan, Ewan, and Burke 2004).…”

“…Other CAC studies consider the issue of citizen influence on planning decisions rather than citizen control of decisions (Crewe 2001; Innes and Gruber 2005; Laurian 2007; Pierce and Doeksen 1983; Sager and Zakara 2014; White 1983). For example, Pierce and Doeksen (1983) measure CAC members’ perceptions of how their recommendations impacted public officials’ planning decisions at five river basins in Washington State.…”

“…For example, Pierce and Doeksen (1983) measure CAC members’ perceptions of how their recommendations impacted public officials’ planning decisions at five river basins in Washington State. Sager and Zakara (2014) consider the degree to which the Hanford Advisory Board’s input led the Department of Energy to incorporate resident concerns and values into the Hanford nuclear site cleanup plan. Other authors focus on how, rather than if, CACs impact planning decisions.…”

“…They ask how the recruitment process resulted in a more or less representative CAC and if representation impacts public official’s willingness to incorporate the CAC’s recommendations into public policy. Sager and Zakaras (2014) also consider representation as one aspect of the relationship between the Hanford Nuclear Cleanup Advisory Board and the legitimacy of the department of energy’s remediation decisions. The case surveys featuring CACs also identify trust as one of the central values of public participation and test whether participatory processes meet this goal (Beierle and Cayford 2002; Beierle and Konsiky 2000).…”