The Hard Problem &amp; Its Explanatory Targets

Majeed, Raamy

doi:10.1111/rati.12103

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…I refer here to the process of dimensional sorting as described above, whereby diffuse multidimensional ur-experiences will have an evolutionary advantage over those more narrowly specialized from the start. This also resolves a philosophical question (e.g., see Majeed, 2016 ), of how is it that a particular assortment of conscious contents can be brought into existence. The question is inescapably an evolutionary one, for which the answer is straightforward if one assumes the process begins with ur-experiences consisting of separable components, because all that remains is for evolution to effect the separation in ways that are functionally useful.…”

Section: Conclusion With Caveatssupporting

confidence: 55%

On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective

Lacalli

2022

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper elaborates on a proposal for mapping a configuration space for selector circuits (SCs), defined as the subset of neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs) responsible for evoking particular qualia, to its experiential counterpart, experience-space (E-space), as part of an investigation into the nature of conscious experience as it first emerged in evolution. The dimensionality of E-space, meaning the degrees of freedom required to specify the properties of related sets of qualia, is at least two, but the utility of E-space as a hypothetical construct is much enhanced by assuming it is a large dimensional space, with at least several times as many dimensions as there are categories of qualia to occupy them. Phenomenal consciousness can then be represented as having originated as one or more multidimensional ur-experiences that combined multiple forms of experience together. Taking this as a starting point, questions concerning evolutionary sequence can be addressed, including how the quale best suited to a given sensory modality would have been extracted by evolution from a larger set of possibilities, a process referred to here as dimensional sorting, and how phenomenal consciousness would have been experienced in its earliest manifestations. There is a further question as to whether the E-space formulation is meaningful in analytical terms or simply a descriptive device in graphical form, but in either case it provides a more systematic way of thinking about early stages in the evolution of consciousness than relying on narrative and conjecture alone.

show abstract

Section: Conclusion With Caveatssupporting

confidence: 55%

On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective

Lacalli

2022

Front. Syst. Neurosci.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Here the evolutionary perspective comes closest to philosophy in a shared concern with the hard problem, of how sentience can emerge from the preconscious condition in the first place [54][55][56]. The most precise and most relevant formulation, in my view, is by Majeed [57] (see also [58]), who separates the ontological aspect, of how sentience of any kind is possible (his PQ) from the question (Q) of how it comes to be manifest in diverse ways, as distinguishable contents. The latter is inescapably an evolutionary question, and from this perspective, Majeed's distinction can be recast in terms of obstacles to evolutionary innovation, of which there are then two: one to the emergence of the sentience of any kind, and a second to the subsequent diversification and refinement of that first experience.…”

Section: Vertebrate Consciousness: a Challenge For Evolutionary Enquirymentioning

confidence: 99%

An evolutionary perspective on chordate brain organization and function: insights from amphioxus, and the problem of sentience

Lacalli

2021

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The similarities between amphioxus and vertebrate brains, in their regional subdivision, cell types and circuitry, make the former a useful benchmark for understanding the evolutionary innovations that shaped the latter. Locomotory control systems were already well developed in basal chordates, with the ventral neuropile of the dien-mesencephalon serving to set levels of activity and initiate locomotory actions. A chief deficit in amphioxus is the absence of complex vertebrate-type sense organs. Hence, much of vertebrate story is one of progressive improvement both to these and to sensory experience more broadly. This has two aspects: (i) anatomical and neurocircuitry innovations in the organs of special sense and the brain centres that process and store their output, and (ii) the emergence of primary consciousness, i.e. sentience. With respect to the latter, a bottom up, evolutionary perspective has a different focus from a top down human-centric one. At issue: the obstacles to the emergence of sentience in the first instance, the sequence of addition of new contents to evolving consciousness, and the homology relationship between them. A further question, and a subject for future investigation, is how subjective experience is optimized for each sensory modality. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Systems neuroscience through the lens of evolutionary theory’.

show abstract

“…A deductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness might well close such a gap. But there might also be multiple gaps to be traversed, as well as nondeductive forms of explanations which might narrow (or close) these gaps (Majeed, ; Taylor, ). Proposed accounts of consciousness are quite heterogeneous—varying in both spatiotemporal scale, and in how abstractly they characterize the mechanisms of consciousness.…”

Section: The Hard Problem and The Science Of Consciousnessmentioning

confidence: 99%

The mind–body problem

Chambliss

2018

WIRES Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The mind-body problem is the problem of explaining how the happenings of our mental lives are related to physical states, events and processes. Proposed solutions to the problem vary by whether and how they endorse physicalism, the claim that mental states are ultimately "nothing over and above" physical states, and by how they understand the interactions between mental and physical states. Physicalist solutions to the mind-body problem have been dominant in the last century, with the variety of physicalism endorsed (reductive or nonreductive) depending upon both the outcome of philosophical arguments and methodological developments in the cognitive and neural sciences. After outlining the dominant contemporary approach to the mind-body problem, I examine the prospects for a solution in light of developments in the cognitive sciences, especially the scientific study of consciousness. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Metaphysics Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science.

show abstract

The Hard Problem & Its Explanatory Targets

Cited by 7 publications

References 22 publications

On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective

On the origins and evolution of qualia: An experience-space perspective

An evolutionary perspective on chordate brain organization and function: insights from amphioxus, and the problem of sentience

The mind–body problem

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About