The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Abstract

The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

Do substances have formal parts?

“…16 See also James Dominic Rooney (2022), who argues that anyone committed to some form of restricted composition counts as a hylomorphist. deflationary terms, as 'principles of unity' that bear a non-mereological relation to substances (Johnston 2006), or as mental projections onto matter (Evnine 2016, Goswick 2018, Sattig 2015, or as abstract roles or offices that portions of matter occupy (Shields 2019). And a number of hylomorphists believe that forms exist in some robust sense, but deny that they are parts of substances.…”