The ‘harder problem’ of the devil's fall is still a problem: a reply to Wood

Abstract

William Wood has importantly distinguished between a ‘hard problem’ and a ‘harder problem’ in explaining the devil's fall. He points out that previous attempts to explain Satan's sin have focused only on the former and cleverly argues that consumer preference theory, when applied to Anselm's account of Satan's sin, can solve the latter. In this article, I demonstrate that Wood's solution (i) undermines itself, (ii) fails to absolve God of the charge of being tyrannical, (iii) surreptitiously reintroduces the harder problem, and (iv) eventually collapses back into the initial hard problem. I conclude by suggesting why one might nonetheless be motivated to distinguish between the two problems and what this implies about a belief in the devil's fall.

The Primigenius Felix Culpa

“…No scholar has been able to avoid arbitrariness in this debate when refraining from blaming God, and those that do end up inadvertently blaming God do so without any great-making features in mind. 70 Even if not eradicating arbitrariness entirely, the arbitrariness in Lucifer's decision in this model is minimal.…”

“…Their decision not to disobey God cannot be subjectively rational because consumers will always choose more over less, and consuming the forbidden good is seen to maximise happiness. 21 If one attempts to explain this by claiming that the good angels refrain from disobeying to avoid punishment, or something along these lines, this contradicts Lucifer's reasoning that resulted in his conclusion that he could avoid punishment, reviving the hard problem. If this is due to a difference in intellect, the fault lies with God, and if not, it is inexplicable.…”