The Hardest Paradox for Closure

Smith, Martin

doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00287-4

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…He rejects the idea that justification is a matter of minimising risk. See Smith (2016). Our arguments against Differential Defeat do not all assume the risk-minimising picture that Smith rejects.…”

Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 96%

Eleven angry men

Littlejohn¹

2021

Philosophical Issues

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While many of us would not want to abandon the requirement that a defendant can only be found guilty of a serious criminal offence by a unanimous jury, we should not expect epistemology to give us the resources we need for justifying this requirement. The doubts that might prevent jurors from reaching unanimity do not show that, say, the BARD standard has not been met.Even if it were true, as some have suggested, that rationality requires that a jury composed of epistemic peers should coalesce around one view about the defendant's guilt, the failure to reach unanimity might be a good reason to worry about the epistemic failings of some small number of jurors but no reason to worry that we've failed to protect the defendant from an unjustified imposition of, say, the risk against wrongful conviction. The arguments for the unanimity requirement will need to come from outside of epistemology.

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Section: E N D N O T E Smentioning

confidence: 96%

Eleven angry men

Littlejohn¹

2021

Philosophical Issues

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“…Smith rejects (P2). He thinks the testimony defeats the rational support possessed initially when the beliefs are similarly supported (Smith, 2022). In denying this, he might also deny Foley's observation that we can know quite a lot in preface‐type cases even when we know that there's some false belief hiding among the beliefs that initially constituted knowledge, beliefs that he thinks we should now abandon.…”

Section: Preface Problemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For discussions of the conjunction rule in the preface or the lottery, seePraolini (2019),Ryan (1996),Makinson (1965), andSmith (2022).…”

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confidence: 99%

What is rational belief?

Dutant

Littlejohn

2023

Nous

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A theory of rational belief should get the cases right. It should also reach its verdicts using the right theoretical assumptions. Leading theories seem to predict the wrong things. With only one exception, they don't accommodate principles that we should use to explain these verdicts. We offer a theory of rational belief that combines an attractive picture of epistemic desirability with plausible principles connecting desirability to rationality.

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Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk

Smith

2022

Erkenn

Self Cite

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A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk.

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The Hardest Paradox for Closure

Cited by 8 publications

References 29 publications

Eleven angry men

Eleven angry men

What is rational belief?

Decision Theory and De Minimis Risk

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