The Hazardous Effects of Antidumping

Abstract

We investigate the extent to which antidumping actions eliminate trade altogether. Using quarterly 10-digit HS-level export data for products involved in U.S. antidumping cases we find that antidumping actions increase the hazard rate by more than 50%. We find strong evidence of investigation effects with the impact during the initiation and preliminary duty phases considerably larger than once final duties are imposed. There are also important differences with respect to the size of duties with cases with large duties experiencing very large investigation effects. We show the antidumping (AD)-affected countries are less likely to return to the market even after the AD order is removed. (JEL F13, F14) * We would like to thank seminar and conferences participants at

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